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NOTES ON SOFTWARE AND DOCUMENTATION
The experimental markets in this thesis were created on a local area network of Windows-based
computers using markets developed by the author in Powersim Constructor version 2.51. The data
coming from the experimental markets was compiled in Microsoft Office Excel version 2007.
The autospectrums and autocorrelograms were done using MATLAB version R2008a. The
regressions were done using STATGRAPHICS Centurion XV version 15.2. The simulations of the
decision rules with the parameter estimates were done in Microsoft Office Excel version 2007.
All data files and software are available upon request for documentation purposes.
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ABSTRACT
Recent experimental electricity markets have tested the rationality assumed in simulation models of
electricity markets, showing tendencies of cyclical behavior as result of a non-rational behavior on
investment decisions. These experimental markets have left out a potential source of cyclical
behavior by assuming full capacity utilization. Simulation models in other commodities have
already shown that capacity utilization plays an important role in the development of cycles.
This thesis explores the rationality of both investment and capacity utilization decisions in the
context of a deregulated electricity market by observing human subjects in twelve experimental
markets. The experiment is designed with two treatments: full capacity utilization (T1), where
subjects make investment decisions, variable capacity utilization (T2), where subjects make both
investment and capacity utilization decisions.
In T1, statistical tests show price and capacity cycles in five out of six markets. Regarding T2, such
tests show stronger indications of cyclicality in capacities rather than in prices, showing price cycles
only in two out of six markets, while capacity cycles in half of the markets. In addition, subjects’
decisions were fitted to simple decision rules based on the bounded rationality theory. In T1,
simulation tests run with such decision rules show that observed behavior is consistent with
cyclicality. For T2, by contrast, such tests show a more stable market behavior and higher prices.
Thus, simulation tests indicate that varying capacity utilization leads stabilization, as indicated also
by visual inspections and statistical tests. Notwithstanding this result, the poor results of the fitting
process call for further research looking for more powerful heuristics.
Keywords: Electricity Markets, Capacity Utilization, Decision Making, Experiments, System
Dynamics.
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RESUMEN
Experimentos recientes de mercados eléctricos han probado la racionalidad asumida en modelos de
simulación de mercados eléctricos, mostrando tendencias de un comportamiento cíclico como
resultado de un comportamiento no racional en las decisiones de inversión. Estos mercados
experimentales han dejado por fuera un fuente potencial de comportamientos cíclicos al asumir una
utilización de capacidad plena. Modelos de simulación en otros commodities ya han mostrado que
la utilización de capacidad juega un rol importante en el desarrollo de ciclos.
Esta tesis explora la racionalidad tanto de decisiones de inversión como de utilización de capacidad
en el contexto de un mercado eléctrico desregulado observando sujetos humanos en doce mercados
experimentales. El experimento es diseñado con dos tratamientos: utilización de capacidad plena
(T1), donde los sujetos toman decisiones de inversión, y utilización de capacidad variable (T2),
donde los sujetos toman tanto decisiones de inversión como de utilización de capacidad.
En T1, pruebas estadísticas sugieren ciclos en precios y capacidades en cinco de seis mercados. Con
respecto a T2, tales pruebas muestran indicaciones más fuertes de ciclos en capacidades que en
precios, mostrando ciclos en precios sólo en dos de seis mercados, mientras ciclos en capacidades
en la mitad de los mercados. Además, las decisiones de los sujetos fueron ajustadas a reglas de
decisión simples basadas en la teoría de racionalidad limitada. En T1, pruebas de simulación
llevadas a cabo con tales reglas de decisión muestran que el comportamiento observado es
consistente con ciclos. En T2, por el contrario, tales pruebas muestran un comportamiento del
mercado más estable y precios más altos. Así, las pruebas de simulación indican que variar la
utilización de capacidad conduce hacia una estabilización, como también lo muestran inspecciones
visuales y pruebas estadísticas. No obstante este resultado, los pobres resultados del proceso de
ajuste son un llamado a trabajos futuros en la búsqueda de heurísticas más poderosas.
Palabras clave: Mercados Eléctricos, Utilización de Capacidad, Toma de Decisiones,
Experimentos, Dinámica de Sistemas.
11. INTRODUCTION
There is a concern about the potential occurrence of capacity cycles in deregulated electricity
markets (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001; IEA, 1999, 2002 and 2003; Larsen
& Bunn, 1999; Lomi & Larsen, 1999; de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Kadoya et al., 2005). Such
concern is based on analogies with other industries, such as the aluminum industry (Newbery, 1995;
Ford, 1999), real estate (Ford, 2001; IEA, 2002) and commodities in general (Backus & Bayliss,
1996; Krapels & Stagliano, 1996), on results of simulation models of electricity markets (Bunn &
Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et
al., 2006), and on results of experimental markets (Arango, 2006a and 2006b) given that no long-
term sequences of empirical data are available (Ford, 1999; IEA, 1999 and 2003; Larsen & Bunn,
1999; de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Olsina et al., 2006; Botterud & Doorman, 2008). It is believed
that these cycles represent a major threat to energy supply because there may be periods with
capacity scarcity to satisfy demand followed by periods with capacity surplus and unsustainable low
prices (IEA, 2002).
Given that it is unlikely that we learn more about the dynamics of deregulated electricity markets
through analogies (Ford, 1999 and 2001), several authors have developed simulation models of
electricity markets assuming decision rules in new capacity (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford,
1999 and 2001; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006). However, the
assumed rationality of those decision rules has not been tested econometrically or in laboratory
experiments. With the aim of testing the assumed rationality in simulation models of electricity
markets, Arango (2006a and 2006b) carried out a series of laboratory experiments of electricity
markets based on the Cobweb Theorem (Ezekiel, 1938)1 to study the rationality of investment
decisions. Step by step, he added complexity and realism to the Cobweb model, obtaining evidence
of cyclical tendencies in Arango (2006a) and well-defined cyclical behaviors in the more complex
markets of Arango (2006b). Arango showed that subjects’ behavior can be explained in terms of
heuristics or simple decision rules that work as mental short cuts to reduce the complexity of the
1 The Cobweb Theorem is the classic theory of cycles and postulates that demand responds to price
immediately, but supply responds with a one period lag. The model oscillates with a period equal to twice the
production lag. Besides, depending on the assumptions about price elasticity, the oscillations may be damped
(convergence to equilibrium), sustained, or explosive.
2task (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), supporting bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1995 and 1979)
over the neoclassical postulate of rational choice or perfect rationality (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1981).
Although Arango (2006a and 2006b) showed experimental evidence of cycles as result of a non-
rational behavior in decision-making, he isolated the investment decisions from the strategic
bidding behavior assuming full capacity utilization. This is one of the criticisms made to the
Cobweb model arguing that no distinguish between production capacity and capacity utilization is
not suitable for explaining the multiple oscillatory periods observed in many industries (Sterman,
2000, p. 798). Some simulation models have studied the behavior of interplay between a capacity
utilization cycle and a capacity cycle (Meadows, 1970; Mass, 1975; Randers & Göluke, 2007).
These simulation models are based on behavioral assumptions, which have been formulated but not
tested as is the case with simulation models of electricity markets. Under these circumstances, this
thesis expands the experimental markets designed by Arango to test the rationality of investment
and capacity utilization decisions to obtain experimental evidence about the cycle hypothesis in
electricity markets. We show autospectrums and autocorrelograms of observed behavior looking for
evidence of cycles. We also propose investment and capacity utilization functions that capture the
intended rationality of subjects. These functions are based on the literature. We explore their
behavior by performing regressions and running simulation tests with them.
We have to point out that the experimental market is not a real market but a theoretic model that is
closer to a real market than previous experiments. In this thesis we obtained experimental evidence
about the cycle hypothesis in deregulated electricity markets when full utilization is assumed, while
of a more stable market behavior and higher prices when the full capacity utilization assumption is
relaxed, showing that varying capacity utilization leads both stabilization and higher prices. The rest
of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 expresses the concerns about the potential
occurrence of cycles in deregulated electricity markets, explaining the sources of such concerns and
showing that more work is needed to address the cycle hypothesis in electricity markets. Chapter 3
details the general and specific objectives of this thesis. Chapter 4 presents the methodologies of
Experimental Economics and System Dynamics and surveys the literature in search of works
combining these methodologies to study the rationality of decision-makers. This chapter finalizes
presenting the most related works with this thesis, showing that capacity utilization behavior has
been little explored. Chapter 5 presents the experimental design, showing how the methodologies
presented in chapter 4 are used to create the experimental electricity markets while posing the
3testable hypotheses. Chapter 6 shows a review of the main experimental results drawing some
initial conclusions. Chapter 7 tests the hypotheses. In this chapter we present formal statistical
analyses, discussing the main findings. Later, we perform regressions on the decisions rules
presented in chapters 5.4 and 5.5 and run simulation tests with them, discussing the main findings
as well. Finally, chapter 8 draws final conclusions, implications, and poses future works.
42. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Three is a concern about the potential occurrence of under- and over-capacity cycles in deregulated
electricity markets (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001; IEA, 1999, 2002 and
2003; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Lomi & Larsen, 1999; de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Kadoya et al.,
2005). Such concern is based on analogies with other industries, such as the aluminum industry
(Newbery, 1995; Ford, 1999), real estate (Ford, 2001; IEA, 2002) and commodities in general
(Backus & Bayliss, 1996; Krapels & Stagliano, 1996), on results of simulation models of electricity
markets (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et
al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006), and on experimental markets results (Arango, 2006a and 2006b).
Secure supply is one of the main challenges of deregulated electricity markets (IEA, 1999 and
2003). The supply depends on investment and the lack of them or making them in erroneous timing
could lead to cyclical behavior (IEA, 2002). In traditional regulated electricity systems, the
government (generally represented by an agency) is responsible for the expansion of the installed
capacity by ensuring that sufficient capacity is in place to cover demand at any time. Although costs
are considered by the government, it acts with caution to prevent shortages, which has frequently
leads to over-capacity (IEA, 2002). In deregulated electricity systems, the agents of the market
make isolated investment decisions. Efforts to coordinate investments adequately to stabilize the
market would in many cases be contrary to competition legislation. Thus, market stability depends
on the rationality of individual investors (Arango, 2006a and 2006b). A rational behavior of
investors could lead to minimal fluctuations, while myopic investors could concentrate investments
during periods of relatively high electricity prices, causing pronounced cycles (Bunn & Larsen,
1992; Ford, 1999 and 2001; Gary & Larsen, 2000). It is believed that these cycles represent a major
threat to energy supply because there may be periods with capacity scarcity to satisfy demand
followed by periods with capacity surplus and unsustainable low prices (IEA, 2002). Under this
scenario, there might be periods with energy rationing given the capacity scarcity, causing adverse
effects for consumers and general economic performance, followed by periods of over-installation,
causing enormous economic losses for electricity companies or even bankruptcies.
5The historic evolution of deregulated electricity markets is still short and no long-term sequences of
empirical data are available (Ford, 1999; IEA, 1999 and 2003; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; de Vries &
Hakvoort, 2004; Olsina et al., 2006; Botterud & Doorman, 2008). Thus, there is no empirical
evidence of regular oscillatory behaviors (Ford, 1999 and 2001; IEA, 1999 and 2003; Larsen &
Bunn, 1999). Take for example Chile, which in the early 1980s was the first country to liberalize
electricity (Arango et al., 2006). Chile’s historic evolution of the installed capacity, peak demand,
reserve margin and the price at which power generators sell their energy to distribution companies
in the Central Interconnected System (SIC for its acronym in Spanish) seems to show some
tendencies towards cycles. A useful indicator of periods of under- and over-capacity is the reserve
margin (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994), which is the difference between installed capacity and
demand (expressed as a fraction of installed capacity). Looking into the annual reserve margin of
Figure 1, there seems to be some tendencies towards capacity cycles, which could be consistent
with the cycle hypothesis. And the annual energy price begins to show a pronounced boom,
situation that could lead to over-investments and to an unstable behavior (Arango, 2006b).
However, the occurrence of cycles should be discussed in the light of longer time series.
Figure 1. Annual installed capacity, peak demand, reserve margin and energy price in the SIC,
Chile. Source: adapted from Comisión Nacional de Energía de Chile (2009).
6Deregulation means that electricity markets become more similar to the traditional and non-
regulated commodity markets. Thus, some of the analogies in which the concern about cycles is
based on are resemblance relationships with some commodities. For instance, Newbery (1995)
makes an analogy between the aluminum industry and the electric system of the UK, describing the
aluminum industry as an industry where competition leads to both volatility and periodic price
spikes, during which producers recover most of their fixed costs. Similarly, Backus & Bayliss
(1996) believe that competitors in commodity markets prefer highly volatile prices and plan their
strategies to take advantage of that volatility for high rewards, forewarning us to expect similar
strategies in electricity markets. Alternatively, Krapels & Stagliano (1996) argue that electricity
markets could adopt the “classic” condition of commodities that capability to supply chronically
exceeds typical demand. Additionally, utility planners are concern because the restructuration of the
electricity sector could lead this sector to a rollercoaster behavior like the aluminum industry (Ford,
1999). However, there is a fundamental difference between electricity and other commodities:
electricity cannot be stored in inventories, which could lead to higher prices than those observed in
other commodity cycles (Ford, 1999). This has prompted new analogies with more similar
industries such as real estate. As stated by Ford (2001), in these two industries investors face long
construction lags, high fixed costs and look for high utilization rates to recover these costs.
Moreover, both industries may experience large swings in prices, especially during periods with
tight vacancy rates or with tight reserve margins. Additionally, the historic pattern of real estate
markets shows boom and bust behavior (Bakken, 1993). This has prompted the concern that a
similar behavior may occur in electricity markets (Ford, 2001; IEA, 2002).
However, although cycles could be a real possibility, we are unlikely to learn more through
analogies and that it has more sense to study electricity market dynamics by simulation models
(Ford, 1999 and 2001). Following this approach, several authors have put into simulation models
assumptions about investment decision rules in new capacity (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994;
Ford, 1999 and 2001; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006). Results have
been consistent: under- and over-investment cycles that cause periods with under- and over-capacity
with the subsequent high and low prices. These models are very interesting and seem to explain
cycles; however, they are based on decision rules assumed by the modelers, where the assumed
rationality has not been tested econometrically or in laboratory experiments.
7With the aim of testing the assumed rationality in simulation models of electricity markets, Arango
(2006a and 2006b) carried out a series of laboratory experiments of electricity markets to study the
rationality of investment decisions. He took as starting point the simplest Cobweb model and step
by step he added complexity and realism to the market to respond to the critics of experimental
economics who argue that real markets are inherently more complex than the markets analyzed in
laboratories and so experimental results are not representative of real economic phenomena
(Loewenstein, 1999; Fatás & Roig, 2004). The experimental results showed that as market
complexity increased, subjects’ performance worsened causing cyclical tendencies in Arango
(2006a) and oscillatory behaviors in the more complex follow-up experiments of Arango (2006b).
The analysis showed that subjects’ behavior was consistent with bounded rationality theory (Simon,
1955 and 1979) over rational choice postulate (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1981). Although Arango showed
evidence of cyclical tendencies as a result of a non-rational behavior on investment decisions, he
isolated these decisions from a strategic bidding behavior assuming full utilization, i.e., he does not
allow subjects to vary capacity utilization. Not assuming full utilization may actually be relevant for
explaining a potential cyclical behavior as we discuss next.
While the Cobweb model does capture the underlying structure of commodity cycles (i.e., the time
delay in the negative feedback for the response of supply to price), it has been criticized several
times (e.g., Nerlove, 1958; Larson, 1967; Meadows, 1970; Sterman, 2000). One of the criticisms
made to the Cobweb model is that it is unsuitable for serious modeling of market dynamics because
it does not distinguish between production capacity and capacity utilization and so cannot explain
the multiple oscillatory periods observed in many industries (Sterman, 2000, p. 798). In fact, it is
not a realistic assumption to presume full capacity utilization. In real electricity markets generators
could reduce their utilization rates by bringing in and back a power plant according to the
economics of the plant. This is also known as mothballing. Evidence of mothballing has been
observed in the UK electricity market, where around 10% of the installed capacity has been
mothballed at different times (Green, 2006). This is done mainly when prices are low to reduce
costs (Bidwell, 2005; Green, 2006; Roques, 2008; Takashima et al., 2008). In another example, The
Federal Reserve of the United States (2009) reports average capacity utilizations of 86,7% and
78,1% in the utilities and manufacturing sectors respectively for the first quarter of 2008, and
Statistics Canada (2009) reports average capacity utilizations of 88.1% and 80.1% in the same
sectors for the same period of time.
8Some industries show at least two distinct cycle periods: a short-term cycle in inventories,
production and prices and a long-term cycle in capacity and/or prices (Sterman, 2000; Randers &
Göluke, 2007). Some authors have already used a more realistic approach than the Cobweb
Theorem developing System Dynamics models and have shown a pattern of interplay between a “4
year” capacity utilization cycle and a “20 year” capacity cycle2. In this pattern, the capacity
utilization cycle results as a consequence of the decisions made to optimize the use of the capacity
during periods of under- and over-capacity, while the capacity cycle is a fluctuation that results as a
consequence of the over-investment decisions made when the industry is performing well and
under-investment decisions when the industry is performing poorly. Meadows’ (1970) and Randers
& Göluke’s (2007) models support this pattern of behavior in the context of livestock and oil
tankers industries respectively. Moreover, Mass’ (1975) model supports the same pattern of
behavior in a macroeconomic context.
Although useful to understand the interaction between capacity utilization and capacity cycles in
several contexts, the simulation models mentioned above are based on behavioral assumptions,
which have been formulated but not tested. Under these circumstances, experimental economics
provide a methodological framework to test the rationality of subjects making isolated investment
and capacity utilization decisions in the context of a deregulated electricity market. Hence, the
present work can be seen as a continuation of Arango’s experiments. The main difference is that we
are relaxing Arango’s full capacity utilization assumption. Thus, in addition to test the behavioral
assumptions of simulation models studying capacity utilization and capacity cycles, we are
attending to the criticism of the Cobweb model not distinguishing between production capacity and
capacity utilization to study markets dynamics.
The present experiment will allows us to test the rationality of investment and capacity utilization
decisions, analyzing their effect over market dynamics to obtain experimental evidence about the
cycle hypothesis in electricity markets. We expect to respond the next central questions: will we be
able to generate cycles in the experiment with variable capacity utilization? In such a case, does
variable capacity utilization have influence on the emergence of cycles? If cycles are not generated
on the other hand, does variable capacity utilization have influence on these results?
2 The exact period of both fluctuations may vary ±20% due to the noise present in markets (Randers &
Göluke, 2007).
93. OBJECTIVES
3.1. General objective
Analyze, through laboratory experiments, the effect of variable capacity utilization over the
dynamics of a deregulated electricity market.
3.2. Specific objectives
Survey the literature of deregulated electricity markets and laboratory experiments in order to gain
sufficient insight to design an experimental electricity market.
Design and develop a System Dynamics model that captures the basic structure of a deregulated
electricity market incorporating full utilization of the installed capacity in a first treatment and
variable capacity utilization in a second treatment.
Design on the basis of the previously developed model a laboratory experiment of a deregulated
electricity market.
Verify the operation of the proposed experimental markets trough pilot experiments.
Conduct laboratory experiments to observe investment and capacity utilization decisions.
Compare the results of the experimental market with full utilization against the results of the
experimental market with variable capacity utilization assessing how capacity utilization decisions
affect market behavior.
Estimate the investment and capacity utilization functions used by subjects, observing their
behavior in simulation models consistent with the underlying models of the experimental markets.
Assess comparatively the experimental results against the simulation results.
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE
SURVEY
This chapter presents an introduction to Experimental Economics and its application into the
System Dynamics field. We begin with a brief review of the background of laboratory
experimentation and its principles. Later, we discuss laboratory experiments in System Dynamics,
where we focus on experimental designs and results. Finally, we present some conclusions about
the surveyed works, pointing out the main findings and an unresolved issue that motivated this
work.
4.1. Principles of laboratory experiments
Laboratory experiments take place in a controlled environment composed by three elements: first
the goal, which corresponds to the objective pursued by the individual participants of the
experiment. Second the system and restrictions, which describes the decision-making environment
and behavioral rules. And third the behavior, which corresponds to the decisions made by the
individual participants of the experiment (Friedman & Sunder, 1994; Friedman & Cassar, 2004).
For example, the goal could be that the agents of a given market maximize their profits, the system
could be a particular type of market where buyers can only buy a fixed number of units from sellers,
and the behavior would be the purchasing and selling decisions. In this environment, the
experimenter controls the goal and the system and observes subjects’ behavior (Smith, 1994).
Figure 2 shows how the basic components of a laboratory experiment on decision-making can be
applied to the System Dynamics method. In this experiment, the goal is represented as the
cumulative error, which is the difference between the CO2 level and the desired CO2, where the
payoff is a function of the cumulative error. The system and restrictions is the representation of the
dynamic simplified model for CO2. Finally, the behavior consists of the subjects’ decisions, which
are the emissions.
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Figure 2. Example of a laboratory on decision-making: control total global emissions of CO2 to
reach a given target for the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Source: adapted from Moxnes & Saysel
(2009).
Laboratory experiments are based on the principles of Induced Value theory (Smith, 1976 and
1982), and Parallelism (Smith, 1982). The Induced Value theory states that the proper use of a
reward medium induces a specific behavior in the agents in such a way that agents’ particular
interests do not interfere with the purpose of the experiment. Parallelism, which we explain later in
this section, deals with external validity of experimental data by resorting to the general principle of
induction.
Monotonicity, salience and dominance are sufficient conditions to induce behavior (Smith, 1982).
Monotonicity means that with a proper reward medium, more is always better (or, alternatively, less
is always better). For example, it can be assumed that every human subject prefers more cash
earnings to less, and prefers less hard work to more. Salience means that the reward received by
subjects depends on their actions and on the actions of the rest of the subjects, and that they
understand this. For example, a reward of US $1 for every Experimental $1 earned in the market is
salient because it depends on subjects’ actions. Finally, dominance means that changes in subjects’
utility come from the reward medium and the rest of influences are irrelevant. For example, subjects
are often concerned about other subjects’ reward. The experimental procedures must therefore make
irrelevant other subjects’ reward by making impossible to know or estimate the rewards earned by
the rest of the subjects. Regardless of the differences in subjects’ characteristics, when we fulfill the
monotonicity, salience, and dominance conditions we enforce the goal of the experiment and can
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make conclusions from observed changes in behavior after changing a control variable. A usual
way of satisfying these conditions is to make payments (in local currency) that are greater than the
opportunity cost of subjects (Hey, 1996).
Although the contributions of experimental economics to empirical economic analysis are generally
recognized by economists, the criticism about the validity of experimental data persists. Critics of
experimental economics argue that experimental results are not representative of real economic
phenomena (Loewenstein, 1999; Fatás & Roig, 2004). Smith (1982) addresses this concern by
proposing the precept of Parallelism. According to this principle, behavioral regularities will persist
in a new situation as long as the relevant underlying conditions remain substantially unchanged.
Thus, if a particular laboratory environment differs significantly from the real world, a new
experiment may be conducted to study the effect of such differences on human behavior.
From the point of view of external validity, the simplicity of the experiments is a virtue rather than
a defect. The reason for this is that real world is often too complex to approximate closely in the
laboratory and futile attempts to do so would decrease the scientific value of the experiment.
Experimental simplicity by contrast, allows controlling over the variables and offers the best
opportunity to gain insight about the questions that motivated the research (Friedman & Sunder,
1994; Friedman & Cassar, 2004). The method of Experimental Economics is well presented by
Friedman & Sunder (1994) and/or Friedman & Cassar (2004), while the main results are
summarized in The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Plott & Smith, 2008). Now we
turn to discuss about laboratory experiments in the System Dynamics field.
4.2. Laboratory experiments in System Dynamics
Since the 80s, System Dynamics researchers on decision-making have used the methodological
framework of laboratory experiments to study Dynamic Decision-Making. Research in this field
emphasizes the link between subjects’ behavior and system evolution (Paich & Sterman, 1993).
Subjects’ decisions alter the state of the system in ways that change the decision environment faced
in the future (Edwards, 1962; Brehmer, 1992; Paich & Sterman, 1993).
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Laboratory experiments in System Dynamics explore Dynamic Decision-Making utilizing
experimental tasks that consist of simulators with an underlying System Dynamics model (e.g., a
model capturing the structure of a supply chain, a corporate environment, some market institutions,
etc.) that is coupled with a user interface. The usual experimental approaches are to cut some
feedback loops to study subjects’ decisions (Gary et al., 2008), to ask subjects to forecast the
system’s behavior based on a given scenario, or similarly, to request subjects to answer some
questions about system’s behavior (Moxnes, 2004). System Dynamics experiments are set up in
complex environments exhibiting feedback structures, delays and non-linearities. In this way,
System Dynamics responds to the criticism of laboratory data not representing real economic
phenomena because they are gathered in simple laboratory environments (Loewenstein, 1999; Fatás
& Roig, 2004).
Now we examine the application of laboratory experiments in System Dynamics. These laboratory
studies address issues such as boom-and-bust dynamics, capital investment, corporate management,
and supply chains, among others. To facilitate their classification, we organize the experimental
studies in two broad research lines: theory building and theory testing.
4.2.1. Theory building
Experiments in economics and psychology have been valuable in formulating hypothesis explaining
human behavior. In System Dynamics, by contrast, experimental research shows immense potential
to propose hypothesis to explain why subjects fail to understand and control dynamically complex
systems. In particular, two behavioral hypotheses can be identified: Misperceptions of Feedback
and Misperceptions of Bio economics. While these two hypotheses draw on bounded rationality
theory and emphasize on the fact that people have poor mental models, each of these focuses in
particular issues.
Sterman (1989a and 1989b) formulated his hypothesis of Misperceptions of Feedback to explain
why subjects perform poorly in environments characterized by dynamic complexity. According to
this hypothesis, subjects fail to assess correctly the nature and significance of the causal structure of
a system, particularly the linkages between their decisions and the environment (Sterman, 1989a, p.
324). In Sterman’s aggregate capital investment experiment (1989a), subjects play the role of
manager for the entire capital-producing sector of a simulated economy making capital investment
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decisions to satisfy demand. Subjects’ decisions led to costly oscillations in orders. In Sterman’s
Beer Game (1989b), each one of four subjects manages one stage of the beer production chain:
retailing, wholesale, distribution, and manufacture. Each subject orders cases of beer to satisfy an
uncertain demand. Again, subjects’ decisions led to costly oscillations in orders. In both
experiments, Sterman explained the results by recurring to bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1995
and 1979) and heuristics or simple decision rules (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which are an
extension of bounded rationality (Kleinmuntz, 1993). Sterman found that subjects’ behavior can be
explained by an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) that misperceives
the delay in acquiring orders and ignores the supply line making more orders than necessary,
supporting this way the Misperceptions of Feedback hypothesis.
Inspired on the Misperceptions of Feedback hypothesis, Moxnes (1998a and 1998b) established his
hypothesis of Misperceptions of Bio economics to explain why persons mismanage bio economic
resources. Moxnes designed his experiments with clear, enforceable property rights, thus avoiding a
basic cause of over-exploitation (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). In Moxnes’ fishery experiment
(1998a), fish stocks (fjords) were private and subjects managed a fjord by ordering new vessels and
the percentage utilization of the fleet to extract the fish resource. The results showed a significant
tendency towards over-investment in capacity, excessive exploitation of the resource and low
capacity utilization. In Moxnes’ reindeer and lichen experiments (1998b and 2000), subjects
managed a reindeer herd with the objective of avoiding over-grazing of lichen and death of
reindeers. Again, enforceable property rights were assigned by setting quotas for reindeer but, as in
the fisheries experiment, subjects over-exploited the resources. According to Moxnes (2000),
subjects over-exploit resources because they behave according to heuristics intentionally rational
for static, flow resources, but not for dynamic, stock resources. Over-exploitation, then, is a
challenge for management because it has more causes than common property issues, and can be
explained by our poor understanding of bio economic resources (Moxnes, 2000).
4.2.2. Theory testing
Besides being used to formulate the behavioral hypotheses discussed before, laboratory experiments
have also been used for testing theories. In the studies we discuss now, researchers have modified
some conditions on the experiments of the previous section with the objective of increasing the
robustness of their results. The other studies we review in this section intend to test the validity of
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bounded rationality theory in dynamically complex environments, in particular in market
environments.
Sterman’s work on Misperceptions of Feedback hypothesis generated a series of experiments to
address limitations in previous studies by changing the dynamic complexity of the environment
faced by subjects and by providing subjects improved decision-making aids for increasing the
understanding of the feedback presented to them and/or their understanding of the dynamics of the
environment.
In his experiment on capital-intensive industries, Bakken (1993) varied the conditions that allow
subjects to become more familiar with the industry and he systematically enhanced the frequency of
market instabilities. Studying boom and bust dynamics of new product introduction, Paich &
Sterman (1993), Langley et al. (1998) and Gary & Wood (2008) experiments varied the strength of
key feedback processes for product lifetime, the strategies of the simulated competitors, and the
number of decision variables and the presence of competition respectively. Diehl & Sterman (1995)
and Atkins et al. (2002) studied a stock management problem in experiments simultaneously
varying the strength of feedback and the length of the delays involved in the task. Studying stock
management as well, Barlas & Özevin (2004) performed an experiment varying the demand pattern,
the type of delay and the decision interval. Young et al. (1997) experiment on capital investment
studied subjects’ behavior when the system falls into uncontrollable feedback loops. And Wu &
Katok (2006) experiment of the Beer Game implemented a known and stationary demand
distribution.
To assess the effect of improved decision-making aids on subjects’ performance, Sengupta &
Abdel-Hamid’s experiment on software development projects (1993) assessed subjects’
performance under different types of information feedback. Machuca et al.’s experiment on
corporate management (1998) allowed subjects to have access to the structure of the underlying
model of the experiment. Following a similar approach to Machuca et al.’s experiment, Größler et
al.’s experiment on corporate management (2000) assessed subjects’ performance under different
types of structural information of the underlying model of the experiment. Howie et al.’s
experiment on capital investment (2000) used an improved interface design according to human-
factors design guidelines (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1992; Vicente, 1996). And Atkins et al.’s
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experiment on stock management (2002) assessed subjects’ performance under different feedback
formats.
The experimental results of these studies are consistent with Sterman’s original results: subjects
perform poorly respect to the experiments’ goals because the heuristics they use systematically
misperceive the causal structure of the system, producing cyclical tendencies on system’s behavior.
These results support the Misperceptions of Feedback hypothesis. With a few counterintuitive
effects (e.g., Bakken’s treatment of frequency of market instabilities and Barlas & Özevin’s
treatment of demand pattern), these results show that complexity matters. When the dynamic
complexity of the environment was increased (decreased), results worsened (improved) with respect
to either the optimal or other benchmarks (Bakken, 1993; Paich & Sterman, 1993; Diehl & Sterman,
1995; Young et al., 1997; Langley et al., 1998; Atkins et al., 2002; Barlas & Özevin, 2004; Wu &
Katok, 2006; Gary & Wood, 2008). Additionally, most of the experiments that used improved
decision-making aids show that these aids may reduce the negative effects of misperceptions
(Machuca et al., 1998; Größler et al., 2000; Howie et al., 2000; Atkins et al., 2002).
To determine if the complexity of simulators caused the observed misperceptions of the dynamics
of bio economics, Moxnes (2004) designed a new experiment to study management of reindeers
and lichen with simplified underlying System Dynamics models: one with only one stock and other
with two stocks. Moxnes found that the basic tendency towards misperceptions of bio economics
remains when the experiment is simplified, showing that, regardless of complexity, inappropriate
mental models cause the poor understanding of the dynamics of bio economics. Moreover, Moxnes
found that subjects’ behavior can be explained by an anchoring and adjustment heuristic, supporting
bounded rationality theory.
Unlike most experiments in economics, which lack dynamics (e.g., Plott & Smith, 2008) or the
most complex ones are based on Cobweb/Cournot Nash markets with one investment lag (e.g.,
Rassenti et al., 2000; Huck et al., 2002; Sonnemans et al., 2004), System Dynamics experiments
can test bounded rationality theory in complex markets exhibiting dynamic behavior. Kampmann
(1992) tested if different price institutions could reduce the negative impacts of bounded rationality.
To do this, Kampmann designed experimental markets involving three price institutions in addition
to two market complexity conditions. The author found that complexity worsens subjects’
performance and although performance is improved by market institutions, it remains significantly
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below the optimal calculated from rational expectations (Muth, 1961). Studying commodity cycles,
Arango (2006a) increased the complexity of the experimental markets by varying the length of
delays of investment decisions and capacity lifetimes. Arango found no evidence of rational
expectations; instead, he observed cyclical tendencies in prices as market complexity increased. In a
follow-up experiment, Arango (2006b) increased even more the length of delays and capacity
lifetimes. This time, subjects’ decisions led to a well-defined oscillatory behavior in prices showing
that the rationality of decisions could play an important role in commodity cycles, beyond
traditional economic theory which attributes such fluctuations to exogenous causes (Deaton &
Laroque, 1992, 1996 and 2003; Deaton, 1999; Cashin et al., 2002). In all these experiments, the
authors found that subjects’ behavior can be interpreted in terms of an anchoring and adjustment
heuristic, supporting bounded rationality theory. Figure 3 shows some results obtained by Arango.
Figure 3. Simulated prices of the market with an anchoring and adjustment heuristic with different
parameters: from literature (lines 1 and 2) and parameters obtained from the average estimates of
the experimental results (line 3). Source: Arango (2006b).
4.3. Summary
The review of laboratory experiments in System Dynamics reveals two works directly related to the
cycle hypothesis in electricity markets: Arango’s commodity cycles experiments with an
application to deregulated electricity markets (2006a and 2006b). Arango found experimental
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evidence of cyclical behaviors in deregulated electricity markets as result of a non-rational behavior
on decision-making3.
Previous to Arango’s work, the concerns about cyclical behaviors in deregulated electricity markets
were based on analogies with other industries, particularly commodities (Newbery, 1995; Backus &
Bayliss, 1996; Krapels & Stagliano, 1996; Ford, 1999) and real-estate (Ford, 2001; IEA, 2002), and
simulation models of electricity markets (Bunn & Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001;
Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006). These simulation models, which
are built on the System Dynamics method, represent an advance with respect to analogies because
the former allow translating the concerns born out of the latter into formal models. These models
have proven useful to understand decision-making in the power industry (Ford, 1997). However,
they assume people’s rationality and therefore do not allow testing it. Laboratory experiments, on
the other hand, allow testing the assumed rationality of the simulation models because the simulated
agents of the models in which the experiments are based on are replaced with human decision-
makers.
As the surveyed experiments show, people’s rationality deteriorates in the presence of dynamic
complexity. Under dynamically complex tasks, subjects very often make their decisions based on
heuristics or simple decision rules that work as mental shortcuts to reduce the complexity of the
tasks (e.g., Sterman, 1989a; Moxnes, 1998a; Arango, 2006b). Frequently, such heuristics lead to
systematic deviations from optimal decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Hogarth, 1990).
Bounded rationality theory in the form of heuristics involving dynamics explains better the
decisions in highly complex environments (Sterman, 1989a and 1989b; Kampmann, 1992; Bakken,
1993; Paich & Sterman, 1993; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Moxnes, 2000 and 2004; Barlas & Özevin,
2004; Arango, 2006a and 2006b). This it is not surprising because people’s rationality is bounded or
limited within certain contexts (Conlisk, 1996; Größler et al., 2004), in particular in complex
situations, where behavior may be governed by different laws than those used in simple systems
(Plott, 1982; Gigerenzer, 2004).
3 Other applications of laboratory experiments in electricity markets have focused primarily on market design
(e.g., Schaeffer & Sonnemans, 2000; Schulze et al., 2001; Rassenti et al., 2003; Vogstad et al., 2005; Kiesling
& Wilson, 2007).
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The results obtained by Arango are consistent with the conclusions drawn from the surveyed
experiments. Arango (2006a) studied the rationality of investment decisions in electricity markets
by means of laboratory experiments of electricity markets. He took the simplest Cobweb model and
systematically he improved its complexity and realism by increasing the capacity lifetime and the
investment lag. Investment decisions gave rise to cyclical tendencies as the market complexity
increased. In an extension of his previous work, Arango (2006b) designed a more complex version
of the Cobweb model by increasing even more the capacity lifetime and the investment lag. This
time investment decisions gave rise to a well-defined oscillatory behavior. Arango showed that
subjects’ behavior can be explained in terms of an anchoring and adjustment heuristic, supporting
bounded rationality theory over the neoclassical postulate of rational choice.
However, Arango isolated investment decisions from the strategic bidding behavior assuming full
capacity utilization and therefore left out a potential source of cyclical behavior (Meadows, 1970;
Mass, 1975; Sterman, 2000; Randers & Göluke, 2007). Leaving out capacity utilization decisions
seems to be a common issue because in most of the surveyed experiments subjects were not allowed
to vary capacity utilization. In Moxnes’ fishery experiment (1998a) the difference between
production capacity and capacity utilization was made explicit. In this experiment, subjects
managed a fjord (fish stock) by ordering new vessels and the percentage utilization of the fleet (lay-
ups) to extract the fish resource. The results showed a significant tendency towards over-investment
in capacity, excessive exploitation of the resource and low capacity utilization. As the context in
which Moxnes’ experiment was conducted (individual management of a common renewable
resource by investing in vessels and utilizing a percentage of the fleet) has few similarities with ours
(competition between five power generators by investing in new generating capacity and varying
capacity utilization), the conclusions drew from Moxnes’ experiment may be of little use for
explaining capacity utilization behavior in the experimental market we have developed.
The dynamics of both investment and capacity utilization decisions has been little explored in
experimental electricity markets. An approach to study both investment and capacity utilization
decisions in experimental electricity markets is presented in Williamson et al. (2006), but as most
experiments in economics, they lack dynamic complexity because investment decisions do not carry
on over future periods. Thus, this thesis offers an opportunity to study the cycle hypothesis in
dynamically complex electricity markets by testing not only the rationality of investment decisions
but also of capacity utilization decisions. The approach advocated in this thesis is to combine the
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protocols of Experimental Economics with System Dynamics. Using a System Dynamics model as
the underlying model of the experimental market allows us to easily portray the dynamic and
complex characteristics of electricity markets (e.g., long investment delays and capacity lifetimes)
in the experimental market. And by using the protocols of Experimental Economics, we are placing
human decision-makers in an experimental electricity market, exercising control over their
investment and capacity utilization decisions in order to test the rationality of both decisions and
draw accurate conclusions about their effect over the dynamics of the market, analyzing particularly
if capacity utilization decisions have influence on the emergence of a potential cyclical behavior.
The next chapter presents the experimental design, describing the experimental treatments,
procedure, monetary rewards and testable hypotheses.
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5. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this chapter we discuss the experimental design. First, we describe the experimental economic
model, depicting two experimental treatments: one with fixed capacity utilization and the other with
variable capacity utilization. Second, we describe the experimental procedure, explaining how the
experimental sessions are conducted. Next, we explain how the monetary rewards given to subjects
are estimated. Finally, the null and the alternative hypotheses are posed: the former based on the
assumption of rational choice and the latter on bounded rationality theory.
5.1. Experimental economic model
We use a computerized experiment of a symmetrical Cournot five player market with linear
demand. The design corresponds to a Cournot market experiment under standard conditions (Huck,
2004)4, except for the investment and capacity utilization dynamic complexity as we explain later in
the experimental treatments. We use five players in order to ensure a non-collusive behavior with
outcomes expected to be about the Cournot Nash outcome or even about competitive levels (Huck
et al., 2004). We use the same experiment of Arango (2006b), with a time step of one year, with
four years before new production capacity is in place and capacity lasts for sixteen years.
Investment decisions are made yearly. Each subject decides freely on investments with the
exceptions that its capacity must not exceed 20% of the total capacity (reflecting the maximum
allowed market share) and that its investments must not be negative. The market price is determined
by a linear inverse demand function with a non-negativity restriction. Information about the realized
price and own profits is given each period. The market price in period t is:


  0,
5
1i ti,
q0.16axMtP (1)
4 Standard conditions (Huck, 2004, p. 106): (i) interaction takes place in fixed groups, (ii) interaction is
repeated over a fixed number of periods, (iii) products are perfect substitutes, (iv) costs are symmetric, (v)
there is not communication between subjects, (vi) subjects have complete information about their own payoff
functions, (vii) subjects receive feedback about the aggregated behavior of the other subjects, and (viii) the
experimental instructions use an economic framework.
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Where qi,t is the production of subject i in period t. Production varies according with the
experimental treatments. There are two experimental treatments. Treatment T1 is identical to
Arango’s (2006b) experiment except for the more disaggregated investment and capacity vintages
while T2 introduces variable capacity utilization.
Following, we describe the treatments and the rest of the experimental design.
5.1.1. Treatment T1
We set up our first treatment, T1, equal to Arango (2006b), where subjects have fixed capacity
utilization (i.e., production equals installed capacity). Production equals the sum of the capacities of
all players. Given the investment lags and the vintages of capacity, production of subject i in period
t is:

4
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t
tj i,j
xi,tq (2)
Where xi,j is the investment decision made in years j = t-19 to j = t-4. The profit function in
experimental pesos (E$) for subject i in period t is:
  i,tqctPi,tπ  (3)
Where c are the marginal costs, which include both capital and operational costs and are equal to 1
E$/Unit.
This treatment links the present work with the literature and is identical to Huck’s standard
conditions for Cournot markets, except for the longer lag in investment and the more disaggregated
investment and capacity vintages, showing explicitly information of the investment that is about to
realize in capacity and the capacity that is about to depreciate in a given period. Thus, subjects
receive information about: (i) their total investments, aggregate over three vintages, (ii) their
capacities, aggregate over sixteen vintages, (iii) their productions, (iv) aggregate production of the
other players, and (v) production of the market (see Appendix A. , in Spanish). This change in the
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information presented to subjects favors model transparency, which in general has a positive effect
over subjects’ performance (Rouwette et al., 2004). Because T1 is run under such information
conditions, T2 has to be run under the same information conditions as well and not under the
conditions used in Arango (2006b). If we do not do it in such a way, the variations in the results of
T1 with respect to the results of T2 could be due either to model transparency or to the variable
capacity utilization (or both) and we might not know precisely which of them is the responsible for
the variations. However, it is not an objective of this work to see if the transparency will have a
positive effect over subjects’ performance. If this was the case, we would have to compare the
results we obtain in T1 against the results reported in Arango (2006b).
5.1.2. Treatment T2
Different from T1, the second treatment, T2, does not assume full capacity utilization because
investors may adopt a strategic bidding behavior (Arango, 2006a and 2006b). In this treatment
subjects have the possibility to make capacity utilization decisions in a yearly basis like the
investment decisions. Given the time step that we are using, the shorter delay that we can use for
capacity utilization decisions is one year. While it might look like a long lag, in real life situations
not only do decision-makers have to adjust the utilization but also have to assess the current status
of several variables in order to make the wisest decisions, activity that in the case of corporate and
economic environments may take up to a year (Sterman, 2000, p. 636)5. Thus, it takes one year
before a utilization decision realizes.
Most observers expect that competition increases capacity utilization rates in electric generation just
as it has done in every other deregulated industry and it is conceivable that capacity utilization
reaches rates above 70%, possible above 80% (Maloney, 2001). Hence, in this treatment capacity
utilization decisions are restricted to values between 70% and 100%. This treatment is also identical
to Huck’s standard conditions for Cournot markets, except for the longer lag in investment and the
more disaggregated investment and capacity vintages as well as for the distinction between
production capacity and capacity utilization. Because it is possible that the installed capacity be not
equal to production, information items (iv) and (v) of T1 become (iv) aggregate capacity and
5 Sterman (2000, p. 640) even reports a value of 1.2 years for a parameter estimation that corresponds to a
delay denoted as “time to perceive the present condition” in an energy environment.
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production of the other players and (v) capacity and production of the market for T2 (see Appendix
A. , in Spanish).
Production equals the sum of the capacities of all players multiplied by their respective capacity
utilizations. Given the investment lags, the vintages of capacity and the utilization lag, production
of subject i in period t is:
 
4
19 1
t
tj i,t-
CUi,jxi,tq (4)
Where xi,j is the investment decision made in years j = t-19 to j = t-4 and CUi,t-1 is the capacity
utilization decision of subject i in period t-1. The profit function in experimental pesos (E$) for
subject i in period t is:
  
4t
19tj ji,
xαti,qβtPti,π (5)
Where β and α are the operational and capital costs respectively. As we just noticed, this extension
of T1 implies a change in the cost function because now we have both capital and operational costs.
The cost function for T1 is6:
iqCic  (6)
Where C are the marginal costs which include both capital and operational costs and are equal to 1
E$/Unit, and qi is the electricity production of subject i.
The cost function for T2 is:
iCIαiqβic  (7)
6 The cost function for T1 is the same cost functions used in Arango (2006a and 2006b).
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Where qi and ICi are the electricity production and the installed capacity of subject i respectively.
As we mentioned previously, β and α are the operational and capital costs respectively.
To link T2 with T1, the Cournot Nash equilibrium must be the same. This implies that the values of
the capital (α) and operational (β) costs must be chosen in order to hold the expression that provides
the first-order condition for the production, which is derived in Appendix B.
We use a time horizon of 70 years which should be large enough to allow learning and eventual
convergence towards some equilibrium.
The model underlying the experimental economic model is represented by System Dynamics
methodology as shown in Figure 4. Notice that there are not feedback structures feeding the
investment decisions for both T1 and T2, while for T2 there are not feedback structures feeding the
capacity utilization decisions as well, i.e., there are not behavioral assumptions because we want to
test the rationality of those decisions rather than induce it.
T1 T2
Figure 4. Stock and flow diagram of the experimental markets.
5.2. Experimental procedure
The experiment follows the standard framework used in experimental economics (Friedman &
Sunder, 1994; Friedman & Cassar, 2004). All subjects were recruited from the same population last
year students in the undergraduate programs of Industrial Engineering, Management Engineering
and Economics at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Medellín, Colombia in spring of 2009.
There were 12 markets, 6 for each treatment. No subject had previous experience in any related
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experiment. Subjects were told they could earn between Col$10.000 and Col$50.000 (US$5 –
US$25 at that time) in about one and a half hour, values that in general are greater than the
opportunity cost of subjects. They knew that rewards were contingent on performance, which was
measured in cumulative profits.
Upon arrival, subjects were seated behind computers. Groups were formed in a random way, such
that subjects could not identify rivals in the market. Instructions (see Appendix C, in Spanish) were
distributed and they were read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects were allowed to ask questions
and test the computer interface. All the experiment parameters were common knowledge to all
subjects, including the symmetry across firms. The initial condition was a total industry production
of 55 Units and individual productions of 11 Units (which implies a utilization of 1 or 100% for
T2). Thus, the price started at 0.5 E$/Unit. These initial values were identical across groups.
Each simulated year, subjects were asked to make investment decisions in both treatments. In
addition, subjects were asked to make capacity utilization decisions in T2. The experiment was run
in a computer network using the simulation software Powersim Constructor 2.51. The software ran
automatically and kept record of all variables including subject’s decisions. Still subjects were
asked to write their decisions in a sheet of paper to keep a memory of past decisions and to provide
a backup of the experiment. At the end of the session, subjects were asked to answer in written a
question about the strategy they had followed during the experiment and an additional question
about difficulties they might have experienced during the experiment. The software interfaces are
presented in Appendix A. (in Spanish) and the experiment is available upon request.
5.3. Monetary rewards
The monetary reward given to subjects is estimated as follows:
Number of experimental treatments: 2 treat.
Number of markets per treatment: 6 markets/treat.
Number of subjects per market = 5 subjects/market
Average monetary reward (in Col$) per subject = 40.000
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The estimation of the incentives for all experimental sessions is:
Expected total value = 2 treat. ∙ 6 markets/treat. ∙ 5 subjects/market ∙ 40.000 Col$/subject
Expected total value = Col$ 2.400.000
These values are estimated based on experience with previous experiments.
5.4. Hypotheses
5.4.1. Rational choice hypothesis: Cournot Nash equilibrium
The null hypothesis is based on rational choice classic theory (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1981). Under this
hypothesis, the economic model has a unique Cournot Nash equilibrium. Table 1 shows the
numbers characterizing the Cournot Nash equilibrium. Previous experiments have shown some
biases (e.g., Arango, 2006a and 2006b). To judge our results in this regard, Table 1 also presents the
equilibrium values for perfect competition and joint maximization. Minor and random fluctuations
around the Cournot Nash equilibrium are consistent with this hypothesis.
Table 1. Equilibrium points for the experimental markets*.
Individual investment
(Units)
Market production
(Units)
Price
(E$/Unit)
Perfect competition 0.63 50.0 1.00
Cournot Nash 0.52 41.7 1.83
Joint maximization 0.31 25.0 3.50
* For T2 all equilibrium points are reached investing the amount specified in the table and making full capacity utilization
decisions, i.e., CU = 1 (100%) for all individuals.
Neoclassical economic theory suggests no cyclical behavior but stability. Any predictable cyclical
tendency would lead to countercyclical investments and stabilization. In fact, if the economist can
show that there is a negative feedback loop, there would be equilibrium and cyclical tendencies will
be prevented by a countercyclical behavior (Stoft, 2002). Accordingly, economic theory normally
attributes cyclical behavior to external shocks, particularly in commodity markets (Deaton &
Laroque, 1992, 1996 and 2003; Deaton, 1999; Cashin et al., 2002). We consider random shocks
generated within a market to be consistent with standard economic theory. Previous experimental
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Cournot markets have found that outputs and prices are not exactly equal to the Cournot Nash
equilibrium but close, typically closer than one standard deviation of the observed price fluctuations
(Huck, 2004). To summarize, we present the next formal hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Average prices are equal to Cournot Nash equilibrium predictions.
Hypothesis 2: Market prices do not show cyclical behavior, while random variations may occur.
5.4.2. Bounded rationality hypothesis: heuristics and cycles
The alternative hypothesis is based on bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1955 and 1979).
According to this theory, satisfactory rather than optimal decisions are made via a search process. It
recognizes the limited computational and information processing capabilities for profit
maximization calculation (Simon, 1979 and 1990). Instead, subjects use heuristics or simple
decision rules that work as mental short cuts to reduce the complexity of tasks (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). While heuristics could lead to near-to-optimal results for simple decision-
making tasks, the results are likely to deteriorate in the face of complexity (Kampmann, 1992; Paich
& Sterman, 1993; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Moxnes, 2004). Thus, we formulate two heuristics: one
for investments and one for capacity utilization decisions.
The investment heuristic is inspired on the investment function formulated in Senge (1980) and the
investment dynamics of electricity markets reported in Stoft (2002). This heuristic is similar to
Arango’s (2006a and 2006b) formulations and is consistent with the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The function assumes that people use a feedback strategy
to adjust their capacity towards desired capacity. The investment function is:
  







 0,tC*tCcαtSLID
*
tC
slαLT
tCMaxtx (8)
Where the Max function precludes negative investments, capacity Ct divided by the lifetime LT
denotes a normal level of investments to replace depreciated capacity, αsl determines how quickly
the supply line (capacity in construction) SLt is adjusted towards the desired supply line C*t/ID,
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where ID corresponds to the investment delay. Finally, αc determines how fast capacity is adjusted
towards the desired capacity C*t. The desired capacity is:







  0,
t
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eP
aeq
aMax*
t
C (9)
This represents a linear function of actual price Pt. This is the same formulation used in Arango
(2006a and 2006b) with the exception that because we do not have information about subjects’ long
run price expectations, we assume that the adjustment is based on the actual price Pt. When Pt
equals the equilibrium price Pe, desired capacity C*t equals equilibrium production qe. The
parameter a is restricted to a < qe to avoid negative slopes.
The capacity utilization heuristic is inspired on the capacity utilization function formulated in
Randers & Göluke (2007) in an inventory management problem. This heuristic assumes that
subjects adjust his capacity utilization towards desired capacity utilization. Such adjustment is given
by the following expression:
 tCU*tCUcuαadjusttCU  (10)
Where αcu determines how quickly the capacity utilization CUt is adjusted towards the desired
capacity utilization CU*t, which is also consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.
Because we do not have information about subjects’ short run price expectations, the desired
capacity utilization is a function of the actual price Pt. and is inspired on the tabular function
formulated in Randers & Göluke (2007). Figure 5 shows the desired capacity utilization function.
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Figure 5. Desired capacity utilization function.
As we can observe in Figure 5, desired full utilization realizes with prices closer to joint
maximization levels than to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. This function is more realistic than a
formulation that assumes desired full utilization at the Cournot Nash equilibrium in the sense that
there is a concern about price manipulation because in a deregulated environment theory suggests
that generation owners could reduce output to raise the price (Montero & Sánchez, 2001; de Vries
& Hakvoort, 2004; Puller, 2007). This function restricts the desired capacity utilization to values
between 70% and 100% to hold consistency with the experimental conditions.
As we saw in the heuristics’ formulation, we are not using price expectations. Arango (2006a and
2006b) asked subjects to forecast price in order to explain investment decisions through adaptive
expectations (Nerlove, 1958). Unlike Arango, we do not ask subjects to forecast price. Given that
T2 includes a variable capacity utilization, asking subjects to forecast price would imply two
forecasts decisions: a long-term forecast (4 years ahead given that changes in installed capacity
realize 4 years after the investment decisions are made) and a short-term forecast (1 year ahead
given that changes in utilization realize 1 year after the capacity utilization decisions are made).
Thus, these forecasts would imply that subjects have to make four decisions: investment, capacity
utilization and two forecast decisions. This may pose a cognitive burden for the subjects due to the
number of calculations they could make, which may result in a poor performance (Roch et al.,
2000; Cronin et al., 2009). Thus, we do not ask subjects to forecast price in T2. We do not ask
subjects to forecast prices in T1 as well in order to exercise a rigorous control over the experiment
and know precisely the factors responsible for the changes in the results of T2 with respect to the
results of T1 in case we obtain important differences in such results, similar to the handling of the
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information conditions. By leaving out forecasts, subjects’ investments and utilizations must be
explained by the available information, which in turn is the information the subjects base their
forecasts on. Next we provide a simulation analysis of the heuristics.
Initial conditions are the same as in the experiment. We choose a = 38 as in Arango (2006b). We
use two sets of parameters and perform some sensitivity tests. Set 1 has αsl = 0.1 and αc = 0.26 and
set 2 has αsl = 0.5 and αc = 0.5. For both parameter sets, we choose αcu = 0.5, which corresponds to
a value used by Randers & Göluke (2007) in an analogous rule for capacity utilization decisions in
an inventory management problem. Set 1 refers to values estimated by Sterman (1989b) in an
analogous heuristic for an inventory management problem and set 2 refers to values studied by
Arango (2006a and 2006b), which represent a more aggressive policy where half of the adjustments
take place within one year.
Figure 6 shows simulated behavior for parameter sets 1 and 2 with full (line 1) and variable
capacity utilization (line 2). As in Arango (2006b), we observe that the heuristic leads to oscillatory
behavior in both cases. Set 1 produces one dominant cycle with an increasing amplitude over time.
Set 2 shows a dominant cycle with a slightly shorter period than the observed with set 1. We also
observe that the variable capacity utilization reduces the amplitude of the oscillations and does not
allow prices to go below competitive levels, showing this way a more stable price behavior that
allows having profits all the time.
Set 1 Set 2
Figure 6. Simulated prices of the experimental market with the heuristics of the literature with full
(line 1) and variable capacity utilization (line 2).
32
Sensitivity analysis of the parameters for both sets shows a tendency towards price stabilization
when αsl and αc are reduced. Low values of αsl in combination with increasing values of αc lead to
stronger instability, which indicates that ignoring the supply line and focusing primarily in capacity
leads to greater oscillations. Behavior is not very sensitive to reasonable changes in αcu.
The simulations in Figure 6 are deterministic. To study the effects of internally generated
disturbances, we introduce a normally distributed noise ut to investment, ut ~ N(0, S21) and to
capacity utilization, ut ~ N(0, S22)7. Figure 7 shows simulated behavior for parameter sets 1 and 2
with full and variable capacity utilization, and without (line 1) and with noise (line 2)8. For set 1, we
observe one dominant cycle period with some minor disturbances, i.e., noise does not affect the
underlying mode of behavior observed in deterministic simulations. For set 2, we also observe
cycles, but the mode of behavior is different with respect to deterministic simulations because we
observe a double-cycle behavior: cycles with relative high amplitudes followed by cycles of lower
amplitudes.
7 S1 is set as the average standard error for regressions of the investment heuristic, while S2 is the analogous
case for the capacity utilization heuristic.
8 Given the inherent randomness in the process that introduces noise into the simulations, we run several
simulations with noise. We show a representative simulation of each case.
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Full capacity utilization Variable capacity utilization
Set 1
Full capacity utilization Variable capacity utilization
Set 2
Figure 7. Simulated prices of the experimental market with the heuristics of the literature for
parameter sets 1 and 2 with full and variable capacity utilization, and without (line 1) and with noise
(line 2).
To summarize, we present the next formal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Market prices show cyclical behavior.
5.5. Methods to test the occurrence of cycles
Regular cycles are characterized by their frequency or periodicity, amplitudes and attenuation.
However, these measures are not easy to obtain for irregular cycles and visual inspections may be
misleading. Estimates of variance measure the dispersion of any data around their average, and
attenuation is indicated by showing variance for different time intervals. Nevertheless, variance
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does not say anything about frequencies or autocorrelation. To capture these aspects and to test for
random and cyclical behavior we turn to spectral analysis and autocorrelation9.
 Spectral analysis: The frequency decomposition of variance is called the autospectrum or the
autospectral density function. Peaks in the autospectrum indicate that variance is
concentrated at certain frequencies. This allows detection of both cyclical tendencies and
period lengths. For instance, white noise has a uniform autospectrum while a sine wave has
an autospectrum totally concentrated at a single frequency (the period).
 Correlation analysis (autocorrelogram): The autocorrelogram measures the correlation of the
variable with itself, at different time lags. The autocorrelogram is most directly interpreted as
a measure of how well future values can be predicted based on past observations. While
random processes have autocorrelation functions rapidly diminishing to zero, cyclicality is
observed when there are values significantly different from zero at different lags.
In addition to the previous statistical analyses, we also run simulation tests with the proposed
investment and capacity utilization adjustment heuristics to test the structure that leads to cyclical
behavior. The simulations are run with estimated parameters for the linear forms of equations (8),
(9) and (10) (see Appendix D for details of the derivation of the linear form of the decision rules).
The following simple linear form is an approximation of the aggregated investment behavior in
equations (8) and (9):
btPmtSLmtx  12 (11)
Where m2, m1 and b are parameters to be estimated.
The following simple linear form is an approximation of the aggregated capacity utilization
adjustment behavior in equation (10) and the tabular function of the desired capacity utilization in
Figure 5:
9 Details about these methods can be seen in Bendat & Piersol (1980) and Box et al. (1994).
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Where m2, m1 and b are parameters to be estimated.
Table 2 presents the theoretical values for these parameters (see Appendix D for details of the
derivation of the linear form of the decision rules), which will serve as references for comparison
with the estimation results derived from the estimation process performed with the experimental
results.
Table 2. Theoretical values of the parameters of the linear forms of the proposed heuristics.
m2 m1 b
Investment
Theoretical values set 1 -0,10 2,55 -1,02
Theoretical values set 2 -0,50 5,63 -2,50
Capacity utilization adjustment
Theoretical values -0,50 0,16 0,34
The next chapter presents and overview of the main experimental results and draws some initial
conclusions based on visual inspections and basic statistics.
10 Z refers to the price, but it is not the actual price. Because the desired capacity utilization function is a
tabular function, we performed a curve fitting process to approximate CU*t(Pt), which resulted in a non-linear
component for Pt (see Appendix D for details on the derivation of equations (11) and (12)).
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6. RESULTS
This chapter presents the main experimental results and draws initial conclusions based on visual
inspections and basic statistics. First, we present market behavior over time for both treatments.
Second, we present basic statistics for both treatments as well. In both cases, we perform analyses
for each treatment as well as a comparative analysis between treatments. Third, we draw some
initial conclusions based on the mentioned analyses.
6.1. Individual and comparative analyses
Figure 8 shows the realized prices of the six markets for both treatments over time. The analysis
could be performed with a focus on prices or capacities. We choose prices because they are easier to
compare with real markets. In T1, prices vary from 0 E$/Unit to values close to 4 E$/Unit,
suggesting a fluctuating price behavior. In T2, prices vary from 0 E$/Unit to values close to 4
E$/Unit, suggesting a fluctuating price behavior as well. In T1, visual inspection suggests
tendencies towards regular price cycles for most of the markets with exploding oscillations in
markets 1 and 2. Although market 4 has no apparent signs of cycles, it still shows great variations in
prices. Regarding T2, visual inspection suggests a tendency towards non-regular price cycles in half
of the markets (7, 9 and 11). Although the rest of the markets have no apparent signs of cycles, they
still show great variations in prices. In general, the results for both treatments show no signs of a
tendency towards stabilization in spite of the fact that the experiment was run over 70 periods
(years).
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Figure 8. Observed prices for both treatments.
Given that the visual inspection of prices in T2 suggests non-regular cycles only in half of the
markets, Figure 9 shows the realized capacities of the six markets for both treatments over time.
The delay of the investment decisions is greater than the delay of the capacity utilization decisions.
There is experimental evidence showing that the longer the delays, the greater the instabilities that
could arise (Kampmann, 1992; Diehl & Sterman, 1995). Hence, in T2 a potential cyclical behavior
T1 T2
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is likely to be reflected in capacities rather than in prices, i.e., prices could be a reflection of short-
term gaming with production while capacities are experiencing cycles.
In T1, the price is a linear function of the installed capacity. Hence, cycles in prices result as a
consequence of cycles in capacities, which are observed in Figure 9, except for market 4. Regarding
T2, Figure 9 presents realized capacities (line 1) and productions (line 2) of the six markets over
time. Capacities vary from values close to 20 Units to values close to 80 Units, where visual
inspection suggests a tendency towards non-regular capacity cycles for all markets. The figure also
shows productions to emphasize on the difference between production capacity and capacity
utilization. It can be observed that subjects did not make full capacity utilization decisions most of
the time. In addition, we observe that productions follow a pattern of behavior similar to that of
capacities, with the exception that productions show a more constant behavior than capacities in the
sense of the minor amplitude of the oscillations, showing that varying capacity utilization allows the
smoothing of the peaks observed in capacities.
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T1 T2
Figure 9. Observed capacities for both treatments.
Table 3 shows a summary of price statistics for both treatments. In T1, we observe that all markets
have average prices closer to perfect competition levels than to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. The
average coefficient of variation shows that the average dispersion of prices is 86%, suggesting a
fluctuating price behavior. Moreover, the table shows high one-lag autocorrelations, on average
0,87, which constitutes an indication of cycles. With respect to T2, we observe that markets 9, 10,
11 and 12 have average prices closer to the Cournot Nash equilibrium than to perfect competition
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levels, while for markets 7 and 8 is the opposite case, showing that varying capacity utilization
allows generators having higher prices. The table also shows high one-lag autocorrelations for T2,
on average 0,78, which constitutes an indication of cycles as in T1. However, the average
coefficient of variation of T2 (43%) suggests a more stable price behavior than in T1 (86%).
Table 3. Summary statistics of the observed prices for both treatments*.
T1 T2
P (E$/Unit) S (E$/Unit) CV α P (E$/Unit) S (E$/Unit) CV α
M1 0,79 0,65 0,83 0,89 1,38 0,93 0,67 0,78
M2 1,15 0,92 0,79 0,92 1,21 0,62 0,51 0,68
M3 1,21 0,70 0,57 0,92 1,75 0,88 0,50 0,92
M4 0,75 0,53 0,71 0,69 2,20 0,62 0,28 0,76
M5 1,05 1,09 1,05 0,94 1,55 0,68 0,44 0,84
M6 0,50 0,62 1,24 0,88 1,93 0,38 0,20 0,71
Average 0,91 0,75 0,86 0,87 1,67 0,68 0,43 0,78
* P : mean price; S: standard deviation; CV: coefficient of variation; α: one-lag autocorrelation.
The implications derived from the difference between the length of the delays of investment and
capacity utilization decisions mentioned earlier have to be consider as well for these basic statistics.
Thus, Table 4 shows a summary of capacity statistics for both treatments. We observe that all
markets have average capacities closer to perfect competition levels than to the Cournot Nash
equilibrium. The average coefficient of variation shows that the average dispersion of capacities is
17% for both treatments. While it may look as a low value, it is in fact a value suggesting a
fluctuating capacity behavior given (i) the linear relation between price and capacity in T1 and (ii)
the fluctuating price behavior observed in T1. We also observe high one-lag autocorrelations, on
average 0,90 and 0,94 for T1 and T2 respectively, which constitutes indications of cycles.
Table 4. Summary statistics of the observed capacities for both treatments*.
T1 T2
C (Units) S (Units) CV α C (Units) S (Units) CV α
M1 52,42 6,95 0,13 0,90 57,10 12,92 0,23 0,89
M2 49,37 10,48 0,21 0,93 55,75 8,73 0,16 0,94
M3 47,91 6,98 0,15 0,92 52,24 10,96 0,21 0,97
M4 53,20 6,53 0,12 0,78 46,07 8,68 0,19 0,95
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M5 50,26 11,77 0,23 0,94 52,72 8,56 0,16 0,95
M6 57,08 8,28 0,15 0,91 48,37 4,27 0,09 0,94
Average 51,70 8,50 0,17 0,90 52,03 9,02 0,17 0,94
* C : mean capacity; S: standard deviation; CV: coefficient of variation; α: one-lag autocorrelation.
6.2. Summary
Visual inspection of prices in T1 suggests a tendency towards regular price cycles in five out of six
markets. In addition, price statistics suggest a fluctuating price behavior and present a first
indication of cycles. Price statistics of T1 also show that all markets have average prices close to
perfect competition levels. With respect to T2, visual inspection of prices suggests a tendency
towards non-regular price cycles in half of the markets. Although price statistics present an
indication of cycles, they also show a more stable price behavior relative to T1, suggesting that
varying capacity utilization favors price stability. Price statistics of T2 also show that two markets
present a bias towards perfect competition levels, while three markets towards the Cournot Nash
equilibrium. The price of the remaining market is even consistent with a Cournot Nash behavior,
showing that varying capacity utilization allows generators having higher prices.
Given that the analyses of prices in T2 are not as conclusive as the analyses of prices in T1
regarding the evidence of cycles, we also analyzed capacities. In T2, visual inspection suggests a
tendency towards non-regular capacity cycles in all markets. In addition, capacity statistics suggest
a fluctuating capacity behavior and present an indication of cycles as well. Given the price statistics
of T2, one might expect more biases towards the Cournot Nash equilibrium than towards perfect
competition levels in the capacity statistics of T2. These statistics, however, show that all markets
of T2 have average capacities close to perfect competition levels, showing that varying capacity
utilization allows exercising influence over prices. Regarding the analyses of capacities of T1, they
are consistent with the analyses of the prices given the linear relation between price and capacity in
that treatment.
While the initial analyses we conducted in this chapter suggest fluctuating behaviors in capacities
and prices for both T1 and T2, with a tendency towards a higher and a more stable price behavior in
T2 than in T1, they can be misleading, especially visual inspections, given that they correspond to
basic tests. Hence, the conclusions derived from them may be not accurate. Thus, the next chapter
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presents the formal hypothesis tests. These tests should make clear (or deny) the initial conclusions
derived in this chapter.
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7. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
This chapter presents the formal hypothesis tests, discussing the main findings derived from them.
First, we present 95% confidence intervals for average prices and capacities for testing hypothesis
1. Second, we test hypotheses 2 and 3 by showing autocorrelograms and autospectrums of prices
and capacities, performing regressions on the hypothesized heuristics, running simulation tests with
the estimated rules, and comparing these simulations against the hypothesized behavior of chapters
5.4 and 5.5. Third, we present a brief summary with the main findings of the chapter.
7.1. Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1: Average prices are equal to Cournot Nash equilibrium predictions
We present the limits for the 95% confidence intervals of the average prices in Table 5. We observe
that hypothesis 1 is rejected for all markets of T1 because none of them has the average price in an
interval that includes the Cournot Nash equilibrium value. Furthermore, all markets have average
prices closer to perfect competition levels than to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. This bias towards
competition was also observed in Arango (2006a and 2006b) and is consistent with previous
experiments of Cournot markets (see summary in Huck, 2004 and Huck et al., 2004). We observe
similar results for T2 in the sense that hypothesis 1 is rejected for all markets, except for market 9.
However, this time only markets 7 and 8 show a bias towards perfect competition levels, while
markets 10, 11 and 12 show a bias towards the Cournot Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the average
prices of T2 are significantly greater than the average prices of T1 (t-test, tcritic = 2,228, tobserved = -
4,09, p-value < 0,01).
Table 5. Average prices and 95% confidence interval limits for both treatments.
T1 T2
E$/Unit M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Lower bound 0,63 0,94 1,04 0,62 0,78 0,35 1,16 1,06 1,55 2,05 1,39 1,84
Average 0,79 1,15 1,21 0,75 1,05 0,50 1,38 1,21 1,75 2,20 1,55 1,93
Upper bound 0,94 1,37 1,38 0,87 1,31 0,65 1,60 1,35 1,96 2,35 1,72 2,02
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We also present the limits for the 95% confidence intervals of the average capacities in Table 6.
Given that in T1 the price is a linear function of the installed capacity, the 95% confidence intervals
of the average capacities of T1 are necessarily consistent with the 95% confidence intervals for the
average prices of T1 presented in Table 5. In this sense, hypothesis 1 is rejected for all markets of
T1 and the bias towards perfect competition levels persists. With respect to T2, we observe that
hypothesis 1 is rejected for all markets because none of them has the average capacity in an interval
that includes the Cournot Nash equilibrium value. Furthermore, we observe that all markets show a
bias towards perfect competition levels. This bias is interesting because unlike T1, we observe
differences between the price and capacity analyses. As we can observe in Table 5, the average
price of market 9 is consistent with the Cournot Nash Equilibrium, while the average prices of
markets 10, 11 and 12 show a bias towards this equilibrium, results that are not consistent with the
bias towards perfect competition levels observed in their respective capacities. Moreover, the
average capacities of T2 are not significantly different from the average capacities of T1 (t-test, tcritic
= 2,228, tobserved = -0,15, p-value < n.s.).Therefore, these are formal tests showing consistency with
the theoretical output behavior reported in the literature about generators reducing utilization rates
looking for high prices (Montero & Sánchez, 2001; de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Puller, 2007).
Table 6. Average capacities and 95% confidence interval limits for both treatments.
T1 T2
Units M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Lower bound 50,76 46,87 46,24 51,64 47,45 55,10 53,98 53,67 49,62 44,00 50,67 47,35
Average 52,42 49,37 47,91 53,20 50,26 57,08 57,10 55,75 52,24 46,07 52,72 48,37
Upper bound 54,08 51,87 49,57 54,75 53,07 59,05 60,14 57,83 54,85 48,14 54,76 49,39
Next, we test the hypothesized cyclical behavior by showing autocorrelograms and autospectrums.
In addition, we perform regressions on the investment and capacity utilization adjustment heuristics
and run simulations with the estimated rules, comparing those simulations against simulations run
with the hypothesized behavior of chapters 5.4 and 5.5.
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7.2. Hypotheses 2 and 3
Hypothesis 2: Market prices do not show cyclical behavior, while random variations may occur
Hypothesis 3: Market prices show cyclical behavior
7.2.1. Test of cyclicality
Figure 10 shows autospectrums11 and autocorrelograms of the observed prices for both treatments.
In T1, the autospectrums indicate cyclical tendencies rather than a flat distribution typical of
random series. The autospectrums tend to be concentrated at around 0,05 cycles/year (period of 20
years) in markets 1, 2, 3 and 5 and approximately between 0,03 and 0,04 cycles/year in market 6
(period between 25 and 33 years approximately). The autocorrelograms show a high number of
significant positive values for all markets (the first three or more lags), which is consistent with
cyclical behavior. Moreover, markets 1, 3 and 5 have significant negative values for the last two or
more lags, similar to the autospectrum of sine functions, which provide stronger indication of
oscillations. Regarding T2, there is a consistency with T1 because the autocorrelograms show
significant positive values for the first three or more lags for all markets, showing consistency with
cyclicality. However, only two markets show autospectrums consistent with cyclicality. The
autospectrum of market 7 tend to be concentrated at around 0,05 cycles/year (period of 20 years),
while the autospectrum of market 11 between 0,03 and 0,04 cycles/year. Market 7 has also a
concentration at around 0,1 cycles/year (period of 10 years), i.e., there is consistency of multiple
cycle periods only in one market. Although the autospectrum of market 9 opens with a peak that is
decreasing in intensity, such autospectrum is consistent with pink noise rather than periodic
oscillations.
11 When calculating the autospectrums we use the last 64 out of 70 data points because the Fourier transform
works better with length series to the power of two (Bendat & Piersol, 1980).
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T1 T2
Figure 10. Autospectrums and autocorrelograms of the observed prices for both treatments.
Autospectrums are based on the last 64 data points of the series, and autocorrelograms present the
95% confidence bounds (horizontal lines).
We consider the implications derived from the difference between the length of the delays of
investment and capacity utilization decisions in this analysis as well. Thus, Figure 11 shows
autospectrums and autocorrelograms of the observed capacities for both treatments. The
autospectrums and autocorrelograms of the capacities for T1 are consistent with the autospectrums
and autocorrelograms of the prices, i.e., these tests indicate tendencies towards a cyclical behavior
in all markets, except market 4. With respect to T2, we observe consistency with autocorrelograms
and autospectrums of the prices as well, i.e., although autocorrelograms are consistent with
cyclicality, autospectrums consistent with cycles are observed only in markets 7 and 11.
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T1 T2
Figure 11. Autospectrums and autocorrelograms of the observed capacities for both treatments.
Autospectrums are based on the last 64 data points of the series, and autocorrelograms present the
95% confidence bounds (horizontal lines).
In general, autocorrelograms indicate cyclical tendencies in the time series of prices and capacities
of T1. In addition, in T1, autospectrums show cycles in both prices and capacities in five out of six
markets. Regarding T2, while autocorrelograms indicate cyclical tendencies in the time series of
prices and capacities, autospectrums show cycles in both prices and capacities only in two out of six
markets.
With respect to the double-cycle behavior observed in many industries (Sterman, 2000, p. 798) and
the support to this mode of behavior shown by simulation models of some commodities (Meadows,
1970; Randers & Göluke, 2007) and the national economy (Mass, 1975), we did not find evidence
in favor of it. Although in T2 we found evidence of price and capacity cycles in two out of six
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markets, we found evidence of multiple cycle periods only in one market as showed by spectral
analyses. It may be probably to the same frequency used for both investment and capacity
utilization decisions. Using a lower frequency for capacity utilization decisions (or, analogously, a
higher frequency for investment decisions) may allow observing a more refined market behavior
where a double-cycle behavior may emerge. Further experiments may explore this issue.
Next, we test the structure that leads to cyclical behavior by performing regressions on the proposed
heuristics.
7.2.2. Test of the heuristics
7.2.2.1. Investment behavior
We explore the aggregated investment behavior for both treatments by performing regressions of
equation (11) with the aggregated experimental results. Table 7 presents the regressions. In T1, we
observe that two out of six markets have significant values for m2 (SL) with a positive average
contrary to theoretical values, m1 (P) is significant in five out of six markets with a positive average,
and b is always significant with a positive average contrary to theoretical values (significance at
least at 10%). Thus, price drives investments, which is consistent with the view that decision-
making in deregulated environments is guided by price (or profit) signals (Stoft, 2002; Olsina et al.,
2006). Moreover, these results are also consistent with other experiments on Dynamic Decision-
Making in the sense that the supply line is ignored in the decision-making process, which is a
source of instability (Sterman, 1989a and 1989b; Bakken, 1993; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Barlas &
Özevin, 2004; Arango, 2006a and 2006b). Regarding T2, the significant values are conflicting with
the significant values of T1. We observe that m2 (SL) is significant in four out of six markets with a
positive average contrary to theoretical values, m1 (P) is significant only in one market with a
positive average, and b is significant only in half of the markets with a positive average contrary to
theoretical values (significance at least at 10%). According to this, supply line drives investments,
which is neither consistent with the behavior reported in the literature (Stoft, 2002; Olsina et al.,
2006) nor with the results reported in similar experiments (e.g., Arango, 2006a and 2006b).
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Table 7. Parameter estimates of the aggregated investment behavior for both treatments*.
m2 (SL) m1 (P) b R2
T1
M1 -0,07 (0,32) 2,88 (0,00) 1,61 (0,00) 29,71
M2 0,12 (0,02) 0,15 (0,58) 1,61 (0,01) 7,90
M3 0,02 (0,74) 1,19 (0,01) 1,19 (0,02) 18,44
M4 -0,01 (0,85) 2,23 (0,00) 1,57 (0,03) 15,37
M5 0,08 (0,10) 1,23 (0,00) 1,08 (0,02) 36,32
M6 0,02 (0,81) 1,44 (0,01) 2,60 (0,00) 13,00
Average 0,03 1,52 1,61 20,12
T2
M7 -0,06 (0,26) 2,86 (0,00) 0,19 (0,80) 32,94
M8 0,14 (0,02) 0,60 (0,22) 1,18 (0,12) 12,87
M9 0,04 (0,56) -0,32 (0,30) 3,28 (0,00) 2,70
M10 0,17 (0,00) 0,22 (0,54) 0,99 (0,22) 15,69
M11 0,12 (0,03) 0,51 (0,12) 1,34 (0,07) 10,44
M12 0,12 (0,03) -0,001 (0,99) 1,98 (0,00) 6,94
Average 0,09 0,64 1,49 13,60
Theoretical set 1** -0,10 2,55 -1,02
Theoretical set 2** -0,50 5,63 -2,50
* P-values are presented in parentheses.
** Theoretical values from Table 2.
The differences between the significant values of T1 and T2 indicate that in T2 subjects use
somewhat different heuristics, or at least heuristics with different parameter values from those
hypothesized. It may be due to information availability. Due to the introduction of the variable
capacity utilization, the available information is greater in T2 than in T1. This may imply that
subjects used more information besides price and supply line in the investment decision-making
process. It indicates that subjects may use different mental models for decision-making according to
the information available at the time they make decisions. Further experiments may work on this
issue.
We also explore the individual investment behavior for both treatments. The proposed investment
function for individuals is:
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Where m3, m2, m1 and b are parameters to be estimated. The index i represents individuals and the
variables conserve the previous names. Table 8 shows the regressions of equation (13) for all
individuals across markets. In T1, we observe 13, 15, 10 and 13 significant values out of maximum
of 30 for m3 (Ci), m2 (SLi), m1 (P) and b respectively (significance at least at 10%). The significant
coefficients are not largely consistent with the coefficients for the aggregated markets in the sense
that SLi has more significant values than Ci and P. In addition, the low values of R2 call for further
research about individual investment heuristics whenever the average R2 is 20,37. Regarding T2, we
observe 18, 13, 11 and 21 significant values out of maximum of 30 for m3 (Ci), m2 (SLi), m1 (P) and
b respectively (significance at least at 10%). While the significant coefficients are not largely
consistent with the coefficients for the aggregated markets, they suggest a similar behavior to the
one reported in analogous experiments in the sense that the supply line is ignored in the decision-
making-process. Although this time the average R2 for individuals is greater than in T1 (25,40 and
20,37 for T2 and T1 respectively), they are still low and call for further research about individual
investment heuristics.
Table 8. Parameter estimates of the individual investment behavior for both treatments*.
m3 (Ci) m2 (SLi) m1 (P) b R2
T1
M1
p1 -0,03 (0,01) 0,20 (0,00) 0,02 (0,76) 0,20 (0,03) 39,83
p2 -0,02 (0,29) 0,12 (0,01) 0,61 (0,00) 0,20 (0,56) 39,18
p3 -0,16 (0,00) -0,16 (0,03) 1,24 (0,01) 2,61 (0,00) 37,60
p4 0,01 (0,67) 0,16 (0,00) 0,18 (0,09) -0,02 (0,91) 18,26
p5 -0,13 (0,01) -0,02 (0,78) 0,14 (0,55) 3,21 (0,00) 12,01
M2
p1 -0,14 (0,01) -0,06 (0,43) -0,02 (0,94) 3,34 (0,00) 12,48
p2 -0,08 (0,01) 0,06 (0,26) -0,07 (0,19) 1,08 (0,00) 17,17
p3 -0,08 (0,00) 0,08 (0,07) 0,06 (0,15) 1,00 (0,00) 47,08
p4 -0,04 (0,42) 0,15 (0,01) -0,24 (0,34) 0,99 (0,23) 13,35
p5 -0,003 (0,97) 0,01 (0,86) -0,12 (0,54) 0,51 (0,33) 1,14
M3 p1 0,06 (0,00) -0,09 (0,27) 0,03 (0,39) -0,05 (0,50) 38,31
12 Note that, unlike the aggregated investment behavior, the individual investment behavior includes capacity
for individuals. This is so because for the aggregated investment behavior price is a function of the capacity,
.i.e., one must use price or capacity but not both, while for the individual investment behavior that is not the
case.
51
p2 -0,06 (0,23) -0,05 (0,47) 0,30 (0,05) 0,78 (0,20) 13,66
p3 -0,03 (0,47) -0,10 (0,19) 0,62 (0,02) 0,94 (0,25) 11,36
p4 -0,01 (0,88) -0,16 (0,02) -0,07 (0,24) 0,89 (0,02) 9,53
p5 -0,05 (0,12) 0,11 (0,05) -0,09 (0,75) 0,98 (0,11) 13,25
M4
p1 -0,10 (0,27) -0,07 (0,38) 0,17 (0,80) 1,81 (0,22) 3,53
p2 -0,02 (0,44) 0,06 (0,38) 0,02 (0,85) 0,99 (0,03) 2,25
p3 -0,09 (0,01) 0,03 (0,60) 0,91 (0,01) 1,14 (0,06) 24,19
p4 0,02 (0,16) 0,20 (0,00) 0,44 (0,00) -0,25 (0,13) 50,21
p5 -0,004 (0,78) 0,19 (0,00) 0,11 (0,17) 0,05 (0,68) 21,11
M5
p1 -0,07 (0,10) -0,02 (0,80) -0,03 (0,84) 0,62 (0,02) 4,36
p2 0,09 (0,05) -0,12 (0,05) 0,39 (0,00) -0,44 (0,35) 30,25
p3 -0,01 (0,86) 0,01 (0,86) -0,05 (0,73) 0,76 (0,13) 0,24
p4 -0,09 (0,11) -0,01 (0,91) 0,45 (0,10) 1,66 (0,13) 37,99
p5 -0,05 (0,40) -0,04 (0,54) 0,45 (0,03) 0,87 (0,31) 24,29
M6
p1 -0,02 (0,42) 0,12 (0,07) 0,16 (0,53) 0,39 (0,23) 10,27
p2 0,001 (0,95) 0,12 (0,02) 0,10 (0,42) 0,27 (0,25) 8,33
p3 -0,15 (0,04) 0,003 (0,96) 0,03 (0,96) 2,58 (0,03) 32,58
p4 -0,03 (0,06) 0,19 (0,00) 0,02 (0,81) 0,99 (0,00) 29,70
p5 -0,17 (0,09) -0,18 (0,04) -0,40 (0,45) 3,28 (0,03) 7,59
Average 20,37
T2
M7
p1 -0,09 (0,00) -0,01 (0,84) 0,17 (0,00) 0,93 (0,00) 41,77
p2 -0,06 (0,11) -0,05 (0,47) -0,29 (0,20) 1,52 (0,02) 4,37
p3 -0,06 (0,11) -0,11 (0,06) 1,33 (0,00) 0,10 (0,91) 38,39
p4 -0,07 (0,14) -0,04 (0,58) 0,10 (0,56) 2,04 (0,03) 7,14
p5 -0,24 (0,00) -0,30 (0,00) 1,03 (0,00) 2,49 (0,00) 52,81
M8
p1 -0,06 (0,01) 0,21 (0,00) -0,17 (0,37) 1,03 (0,02) 44,43
p2 -0,09 (0,01) 0,03 (0,57) 0,02 (0,92) 1,33 (0,01) 15,01
p3 -0,15 (0,00) -0,06 (0,41) -0,20 (0,50) 3,22 (0,00) 18,21
p4 -0,02 (0,20) -0,03 (0,63) -0,02 (0,78) 0,26 (0,05) 2,70
p5 -0,21 (0,00) -0,01 (0,85) 0,35 (0,12) 4,48 (0,00) 22,48
M9
p1 -0,14 (0,03) -0,12 (0,12) 0,02 (0,90) 2,14 (0,01) 8,08
p2 -0,02 (0,12) 0,19 (0,00) -0,02 (0,78) 0,23 (0,18) 25,58
p3 -0,09 (0,09) -0,13 (0,07) -0,52 (0,01) 3,66 (0,00) 11,78
p4 -0,01 (0,88) 0,02 (0,82) -0,15 (0,64) 0,82 (0,53) 1,15
p5 -0,07 (0,02) 0,12 (0,02) -0,23 (0,12) 1,78 (0,01) 24,69
M10
p1 -0,07 (0,17) -0,01 (0,89) 0,11 (0,44) 0,82 (0,15) 3,84
p2 -0,04 (0,00) -0,02 (0,69) 0,02 (0,07) 0,81 (0,00) 40,93
p3 0,02 (0,50) 0,03 (0,59) 0,31 (0,06) -0,29 (0,67) 6,53
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p4 -0,05 (0,00) 0,20 (0,00) 0,08 (0,06) 0,34 (0,04) 74,28
p5 -0,01 (0,75) 0,17 (0,00) 0,29 (0,40) -0,18 (0,87) 25,59
M11
p1 -0,13 (0,00) 0,12 (0,00) -0,51 (0,00) 2,56 (0,00) 60,07
p2 -0,08 (0,00) 0,11 (0,03) -0,36 (0,09) 1,88 (0,00) 27,22
p3 -0,02 (0,60) 0,12 (0,15) -0,03 (0,86) 0,78 (0,22) 3,58
p4 -0,17 (0,01) -0,09 (0,20) 0,06 (0,63) 2,04 (0,00) 11,56
p5 -0,11 (0,00) 0,02 (0,69) 0,54 (0,01) 0,99 (0,02) 33,36
M12
p1 -0,02 (0,04) 0,23 (0,00) -0,07 (0,34) 0,67 (0,00) 42,20
p2 -0,13 (0,01) 0,12 (0,01) -0,09 (0,29) 1,80 (0,00) 35,86
p3 0,002 (0,83) 0,27 (0,00) 0,09 (0,37) -0,10 (0,66) 46,58
p4 -0,14 (0,00) -0,01 (0,85) 0,12 (0,63) 2,95 (0,00) 18,66
p5 0,01 (0,59) 0,004 (0,94) 0,18 (0,00) -0,17 (0,22) 13,02
Average 25,40
* P-values are presented in parentheses.
A common result observed in the regressions of the hypothesized investment heuristic at individual
market level in both T1 and T2 is that the significant coefficients are not largely consistent with the
coefficients for the aggregated markets. Previous and simpler Cournot experiments have also failed
to explain individual investments (Rassenti et al., 2000; Huck et al., 2002; Arango, 2006a). They
have not found completely satisfactory models to explain individual behavior, and indicate the need
for further research. While we have tested one hypothetical investment function, further
investigations may reveal more powerful investment heuristics. Moreover, the poor results of the
regressions reinforced the need for further investigation about investment heuristics at both
aggregated and individual market levels.
7.2.2.2. Capacity utilization adjustment behavior
Now we explore the aggregated capacity utilization adjustment behavior (this is only for T2) by
performing regressions of equation (12) with the aggregated experimental results. Table 9 presents
the regressions. We observe that the coefficient m2 (CU) is always significant with a positive
average equal to the theoretical value, m1 (Z) is always significant with a positive average, and b is
always significant with a negative average contrary to theoretical values (significance at least at
10%). Thus, CU and Z (price) drive the adjustment process. Moreover, their average coefficients
indicate consistency with the hypothesized non-full utilization behavior (Montero & Sánchez, 2001;
de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Puller, 2007), which could lead to the exercise of market power as was
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demonstrated during the electricity crisis in California (Joskow & Kahn, 2002; Puller, 2007). It is
also consistent with the non-full utilization behavior reported by, for example, The Federal Reserve
of the United States (2009) and Statistics Canada (2009) in the utilities sector.
Table 9. Parameter estimates of the aggregated capacity utilization adjustment behavior*.
m2 (CU) m1 (Z) B R2
M7 -0,36 (0,00) 1,49 (0,01) -1,20 (0,05) 28,62
M8 -0,68 (0,00) 2,99 (0,00) -2,40 (0,01) 46,06
M9 -0,48 (0,00) 0,57 (0,08) -0,17 (0,60) 33,99
M10 -0,62 (0,00) 14,34 (0,01) -13,82 (0,01) 43,49
M11 -0,36 (0,00) 2,67 (0,00) -2,35 (0,00) 43,62
M12 -0,53 (0,00) 0,03 (0,01) 0,39 (0,00) 44,26
Average -0,50 3,68 -3,26 40,01
Theoretical** -0,50 0,16 0,34
* P-values are presented in parentheses.
** Theoretical values from Table 2.
We also explore the individual capacity utilization adjustment behavior. The proposed capacity
utilization adjustment function for individuals is:
b
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t
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Where m2, m1 and b are parameters to be estimated. The index i represents individuals and the
variables conserve the previous names. Table 10 shows the regressions of equation (14) for all
individuals across markets. We observe that the coefficient m2 (CUi) is always significant, except in
one case, while m1 (Z) and b have 7 and 6 significant values out of maximum of 30 respectively
(significance at least at 10%). Thus, CUi drives the adjustment process. It implies that the higher the
capacity utilization the lower the adjustment no matter the price, which is not consistent with the
aggregated behavior. As with the investment behavior, we have tested only one hypothetical
capacity utilization function. Further investigations may reveal more powerful capacity utilization
heuristics. Moreover, the poor results of the regressions reinforced the need for further investigation
about capacity utilization heuristics at both aggregated and individual market levels.
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Table 10. Parameter estimates of the individual capacity utilization adjustment behavior*.
m2 (CUi) m1 (Z) b R2
M7
p1 -0,62 (0,00) 1,96 (0,13) -1,39 (0,27) 31,29
p2 -0,40 (0,00) 0,75 (0,49) -0,42 (0,70) 20,96
p3 -0,33 (0,00) 0,48 (0,60) -0,22 (0,80) 16,50
p4 -0,87 (0,00) 2,26 (0,02) -1,56 (0,10) 47,29
p5 -0,29 (0,00) -2,50 (0,02) 2,73 (0,01) 21,72
M8
p1 -0,46 (0,00) 0,42 (0,81) -0,02 (0,99) 22,62
p2 -0,42 (0,00) -0,20 (0,92) 0,56 (0,77) 21,27
p3 -0,55 (0,00) -1,82 (0,26) 2,24 (0,17) 28,17
p4 -0,43 (0,00) -0,18 (0,91) 0,55 (0,75) 21,56
p5 -0,78 (0,00) 2,33 (0,15) -1,57 (0,33) 39,63
M9
p1 -0,26 (0,00) 0,85 (0,22) -0,64 (0,35) 14,10
p2 -0,61 (0,00) 1,44 (0,03) -0,83 (0,16) 29,84
p3 -0,80 (0,00) 0,09 (0,86) 0,49 (0,33) 40,00
p4 -0,48 (0,00) 2,13 (0,02) -1,69 (0,05) 24,97
p5 -0,42 (0,00) 0,03 (0,97) 0,33 (0,64) 21,69
M10
p1 -0,66 (0,00) 14,48 (0,22) -13,91 (0,24) 35,30
p2 -0,96 (0,00) 2,15 (0,24) -1,46 (0,42) 47,65
p3 -0,73 (0,00) 1,26 (0,92) -0,62 (0,96) 36,94
p4 -0,10 (0,07) 3,94 (0,43) -3,85 (0,44) 4,92
p5 -0,06 (0,23) 1,76 (0,60) -1,70 (0,61) 2,34
M11
p1 -0,20 (0,01) 1,32 (0,23) -1,16 (0,29) 10,48
p2 -0,56 (0,00) 3,31 (0,04) -2,79 (0,07) 29,33
p3 -1,00 (0,00) 0,05 (0,96) 0,67 (0,53) 55,15
p4 -1,04 (0,00) 0,13 (0,88) 0,90 (0,27) 51,49
p5 -0,25 (0,00) -0,02 (0,99) 0,25 (0,83) 12,69
M12
p1 -0,56 (0,00) 2,93 (0,66) -2,45 (0,71) 28,18
p2 -0,26 (0,00) 7,43 (0,18) -7,18 (0,19) 17,70
p3 -1,06 (0,00) -18,17 (0,02) 18,95 (0,01) 56,10
p4 -0,72 (0,00) -13,20 (0,09) 13,78 (0,07) 40,49
p5 -1,08 (0,00) 1,60 (0,89) -0,71 (0,95) 54,75
Average 29,50
* P-values are presented in parentheses.
Next, we test the estimated heuristics by running simulations with them and comparing those
simulations against simulations run with the theoretical hypothesized behavior of chapters 5.4 and
5.5.
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7.2.2.3. Behavioral implications of the estimated heuristics
Now, we compare simulations run with the aggregated linear regression model with the theoretical
values from Table 2 against simulations run with the aggregated linear regression model with the
averages of the estimated parameters in Table 7 (T1) and Table 7 and Table 9 (T2). For T1, Figure
12 shows similar cycles, except that the simulation with the averages of the estimated parameters
has a longer period and minor amplitude. For T2, Figure 12 shows similar cycles in capacities and
prices for the simulations run with theoretical values, but it also shows a quite stable behavior in
both capacity and price for the simulations run with the averages of the estimated parameters. This
is an indication of capacity utilization leading to a more stable market behavior as suggested in
Arango (2006b). A clearer picture of this can be observed in Figure 13, where simulations run with
the averages of the estimated parameters with full capacity utilization show dampened cycles, while
simulations run with variable capacity utilization (the same simulations in line 3 of Figure 12 for
T2) show a more stable behavior and higher prices.
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Capacity Price
T1
Capacity Price
T2
Figure 12. Simulation of the aggregated investment rule for T1 and the aggregated investment and
capacity utilization adjustment rules for T2 with the theoretical values of investment set 1 (line 1)
and set 2 (line 2) and theoretical values of capacity utilization adjustment (only for T2), and the
average estimates from aggregated experimental results (line 3).
Capacity Price
Figure 13. Simulation of the aggregated investment and capacity utilization adjustment rules for T2
with average estimates from aggregated experimental results with variable (line 1) and full (line 2)
capacity utilization.
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We also run simulations with the estimated parameters for individuals in Table 8 (T1) and Table 8
and Table 10 (T2), which can be observed in Figure 14. For T1, the results at individual market
level are largely consistent with the results at aggregated market level. We observe that markets 1, 4
and 5 show a pattern of behavior similar to the behavior observed in Figure 12 at aggregated market
level with the averages of the estimated parameters, while markets 3 and 6 show dampened cycles.
Thus, this test can be use to reject hypothesis 2, but it cannot be used to discard hypothesis 3.
However, the accuracy of the test is reduced by the poor results of the regressions, where the
average R2 are 20,12 and 20,37 at aggregated and individual market levels respectively. Regarding
T2, the results at individual market level are largely consistent with the results at aggregated market
level as well. We observe strong oscillations in both capacities and prices only in markets 8 and 10,
while weaker oscillations in market 7. That is, we observe a more stable behavior in T2 than in T1.
In addition, the different scales used in the figures of prices allow seeing higher prices in T2 than in
T1. Thus, this test can be used to reject hypothesis 3, but it cannot be use to discard hypothesis 2.
But as for T1, the accuracy of the test is reduced by the poor results of the regressions, where the
average R2 for investment are 13,60 and 25,40 and for capacity utilization adjustment are 40,01 and
29,50 at aggregated and individual market levels respectively.
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Capacity Price
T1
Capacity Price
T2
Figure 14. Simulation of the individual investment rule for T1 and the individual investment and
capacity utilization adjustment rules for T2 with estimates from individual experimental results (line
number and line number+6 represents the number of the market for T1 and T2 respectively).
Because the main treatment difference between T1 and T2 is the variable capacity utilization, it is
safe to conclude that varying capacity utilization leads stabilization. This is due to the shorter delay
of capacity utilization decisions, which was only one period, compared against the delay of
investment decisions, which was four periods, i.e., subjects can have faster reaction and adjustment
of production in T2 than in T1. It means that in T2, subjects had the possibility to influence market
prices faster than in T1, where it took four periods to do so. In case there were periods with surplus
capacity, it only took one year to cut production to help prices to rise. In fact, the average prices of
T2 are significantly higher than those of T1 as we tested previously. In addition, the lower bound
used for capacity utilization decisions (70% of the installed capacity) did not allow subjects to raise
price in dramatic ways, which could lead to over-investments and to an unstable behavior (Arango,
2006b).
59
7.3. Summary
In T1, autocorrelograms and autospectrums support the cycle hypothesis in five out of six markets.
In addition, simulation tests at aggregated market level are also consistent with the cycle hypothesis,
while at individual market level we observe consistency with this hypothesis in five out of six
markets. We also found that capacities and prices have a bias towards perfect competition levels,
showing consistency with previous Cournot experiments.
Regarding T2, autocorrelograms show stronger indications of cyclical tendencies in both prices and
capacities. However, autospectrums show weaker indications of cycles relative to T1 because cycles
in both prices and capacities were observed only in two out of six markets. Moreover, we found
evidence of the double-cycle period reported in the literature only in one market. Simulation tests at
aggregated market level are not consistent with the cycle hypothesis. In addition, such tests show
oscillations at individual market level only in half of the markets. We also found that capacities
have a bias towards perfect competition levels, while prices towards Cournot Nash levels. These
results imply that varying capacity utilization has a stabilizing effect over market behavior and
allows having higher prices.
The next chapter draws the final conclusions, discusses some implications that the results might
have for different market actors, and poses further works according to some limitations of the
present experiment.
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter presents a review of the main findings of this work. We begin with a summary of the
main findings derived from all the hypothesis tests we performed. Later, we discuss some of the
implications that our findings may have upon market actors. Finally, we discuss some of the
limitations of this work and pose further research based on such limitations.
8.1. Findings
This thesis presented an experimental electricity market to study the effect of variable capacity
utilization over market dynamics. We explored the potential occurrence of cycles (cycle hypothesis)
in electricity markets in two experimental treatments: first we assumed full capacity utilization (T1)
and second we relaxed this assumption allowing subjects to make capacity utilization decisions
(T2). Previous simulation models (e.g., Ford, 2001; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006) and
experimental studies (e.g., Arango, 2006b) of electricity markets have shown cyclical behavior.
However, they assumed full capacity utilization, leaving out a potential source of cyclical behavior
(Meadows, 1970; Mass, 1975; Sterman, 2000; Randers & Göluke, 2007). Thus, we isolated
investment and capacity utilization decisions to study the rationality of these decisions in an
experimental market.
In T1, we found indications of cyclical tendencies in capacities and prices in five out of six markets
by visual inspections, basic statistics, autocorrelograms and autospectrums. All observations were
consistent with the cycle hypothesis, as suggested by behavioral simulation models (Bunn &
Larsen, 1992 and 1994; Ford, 1999 and 2001; Larsen & Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et
al., 2006) and previous experiments (Arango, 2006a and 2006b) of electricity markets. In addition,
we found, on average, a tendency towards a competitive behavior in capacities and prices in all
markets.
On the other hand, in T2, the indications of cyclical tendencies were stronger in capacities than in
prices. Visual inspections and basic statistics suggested non-regular price cycles in half of the
markets. Autocorrelograms suggested cyclical tendencies in all markets, but autospectrums showed
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cycles only in two out of six markets. Regarding capacities, visual inspections and basic statistics
suggested non-regular capacity cycles in all markets. It was reinforced by autocorrelograms, which
suggested cyclical tendencies in all markets, but autospectrums indicated cycles only in two out of
six markets. In addition, we found, on average, a tendency towards a competitive behavior in
capacities in all markets and a tendency towards a Cournot Nash behavior in prices in four out of
six markets. Thus, these results indicate that varying capacity utilization favors stability and allows
having higher prices. This experiment shows the importance of capacity utilization decisions in
market dynamics, where there is empirical evidence of market power in the electricity industry due
to low capacity utilization rates (Joskow & Kahn, 2002; Puller, 2007).
With respect to the double-cycle behavior reported in the literature (Meadows, 1970; Mass, 1975;
Sterman, 2000; Randers & Göluke, 2007), we did not find evidence except in one market of T2. It
may be probably due to the frequency in decisions. Using a lower frequency for capacity utilization
decisions may allow observing a more refined market behavior where a double-cycle behavior may
emerge. Further experiments may explore this issue.
At aggregated market level, the regressions of the hypothesized investment heuristic in T1 were
consistent with the literature in the sense that price drove investments (Stoft, 2002; Olsina et al.,
2006) and that supply line was ignored (e.g., Sterman, 1989a and 1989b; Arango, 2006a and
2006b). However, in T2, we did not observe such consistency, probably because in T2 subjects had
more information available than in T1 at the time they make decisions and therefore they might use
more information in the investment decision-making process. Further investigations may work on
this issue. Regarding the regressions of the hypothesized capacity utilization adjustment heuristic,
they were consistent with the hypothesized non-full utilization behavior (Montero & Sánchez, 2001;
de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Puller, 2007) and the non-full utilization behavior reported by, for
example, The Federal Reserve of the United States (2009) and Statistics Canada (2009) in the
utilities sector.
Regarding the regressions at individual market level, they were not largely consistent with the
coefficients for the aggregated markets in both T1 and T2. Further investigations may reveal more
powerful investment and capacity utilization functions. An approach like the one used in some
experiments on expectation formation (Sonnemans et al., 2004; Hommes et al., 2005) may be
useful for addressing such an issue. Sonnemans et al. (2004) and Hommes et al. (2005) asked
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subjects to formulate detailed expectation strategies. Then, their strategies were programmed and
markets were simulated. Such an approach may be adapted to ask subjects to formulate detailed
investment and capacity utilization strategies. However, there is trade-off between the quality of the
heuristics and the amount of information about market behavior gathered in the experiment given
that programming the strategies is a time-consuming activity.
Simulation tests run with parameter estimates from experimental data showed that observed
behavior in T1 was consistent with the hypothesized behavior or cyclicality at both aggregated and
individual market levels. By contrast, in T2 the observed behavior was consistent with the
hypothesized behavior only at individual market level, where only half of the markets showed
oscillations. We did not observe consistency with the hypothesized behavior at aggregated market
level. That is, varying capacity utilization leads stabilization as indicated also by visual inspections,
basic statistics, autocorrelograms and autospectrums. However, some markets run under variable
capacity utilization still showed cyclical tendencies. Hence, these findings should serve as a
motivation for further research of stabilizing policies in deregulated electricity markets.
Notwithstanding this result, the poor results of the regressions at both aggregated and individual
market levels call for further research looking for more powerful investment and capacity utilization
heuristics.
8.2. Implications
The focus of this work has been the study of the cycle hypothesis in deregulated electricity markets
in an experimental market closer to reality than previous experimental markets. To do this, we
introduced variable capacity utilization or mothballing and studied its effects over market dynamics,
assessing specifically if this had influence on the emergence of cycles.
Our analyses showed that mothballing leads both stabilization and higher prices compared with
markets where mothballing was not allowed. This may have implications for some market actors
and consumers. From the point of view of the concern about the potential occurrence of cycles and
their prejudicial effects for society welfare in general, these results suggest that regulators should
allow generators to bring in and back part of their installed capacities (mothballing) in order to
reduce price volatility (smooth or dampen cycles).
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There is a trade-off associated with the reduction in price volatility that mothballing can achieve,
however. As our results showed, such trade-off is associated with higher prices. We observed that
most of the markets run under variable capacity utilization had average prices biased towards the
Cournot Nash equilibrium rather than towards competitive levels, which is consistent with the
concern about low utilization rates behavior seeking to influence prices (Montero & Sánchez, 2001;
de Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Puller, 2007). In fact, there is evidence of generators influencing their
incomes by mothballing capacity in UK (Office of Electricity Regulation, 1998, p. 152). Even
though such departures from competitive prices are acceptable and common in “workable”
competitive markets (Reitzes et al., 2000; David & Wen, 2001), the question of how large the prices
should be permitted naturally arises. How large the prices should be permitted would depend upon
if at such prices generators are exercising market power (Reitzes et al., 2000). In these “workable”
electricity markets one may be looking at an exercise of market power if no opportunities exist for
additional firms to enter the market (Reitzes et al., 2000; Tamaschke et al., 2005) because
incumbent generators may engage in entry deterrence strategies such as building excess generating
capacity in conjunction with mothballing some of that capacity (Tamaschke et al., 2005). Hence,
holding other things constant, a regulatory policy seeking to assure the long-term stability of the
market via mothballing should closely monitor the relationship between mothballed capacity and
price looking for the conditions under which there are not opportunities for additional firms to enter
the market.
On the other hand, if markets with lower prices are preferred over markets with higher prices and
their potential exercise of market power, the associated trade-off is higher price volatility
(occurrence of cycles). High price volatility is unacceptable to consumers (Tishler et al., 2008);
they prefer price stability (Woo et al., 2006). In addition, the occurrence of cycles represents a
major threat to energy supply because there may be periods with capacity scarcity to satisfy demand
followed by periods with capacity surplus and unsustainable low prices (IEA, 2002). This scenario
would be unacceptable for generators as well because they may have enormous economic losses
during periods with capacity surplus and they may even go bankrupt. Moreover, the occurrence of
cycles means that there is no such thing as long-term stability of the market, which is one of the
major concerns in deregulated electricity markets (Newbery, 2002; Wen et al., 2004; Bidwell, 2005;
Kadoya et al., 2005; Joskow, 2006 and 2008; Sioshansi, 2006; de Vries, 2007; Tishler et al., 2008).
In other words, under this scenario there would not be consistent supply reliability at reasonably
stable prices over time (Bidwell, 2005; Kadoya et al., 2005). Hence, holding other things constant, a
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regulatory policy where mothballing is not allowed would not be as desirable as a regulatory policy
where mothballing is allowed because the former does not achieve long-term stability of the market.
To close the argument in favor of allowing mothballing as a possible regulatory policy with the
subsequent higher prices that this may cause, one must point out that given that electricity markets
are basically oligopolies, market suppliers have market power to manipulate prices to some extent
(Wen et al., 2004), where mothballing could be seen as a strategic behavior that may lead to market
power (Tamaschke et al., 2005). Moreover, given that most existing electricity markets have a
limited price-elasticity of demand, prices can be manipulated (Reitzes et al., 2000; de Vries, 2007).
This means that regulation cannot eliminate the existence of market power, but can limit the ability
of exercising market power (Reitzes et al., 2000; David & Wen, 2001). Hence, the objective of
regulation should be to set up a “workable” electricity market rather than a perfectly competitive
one (Reitzes et al., 2000; David & Wen, 2001) where the ability of exercising market power can be
limited by regulations aimed to provide end users with greater price sensitivity (Reitzes et al., 2000;
Stoft, 2002) and controlling the number and relative size of competitors (Stoft, 2002).
8.3. Limitations and further work
While our experiment represents an advance with respect to similar experiments (e.g., Arango,
2006a and 2006b; Williamson et al., 2006), it still has assumptions that differ from reality. For
example, the demand in the experiment does not present demand growth or dynamic adjustment,
which is more realistic and has implications for market stability. In fact, demand growth may create
an effect of amplifications of cycles as shown by Ford (1999) through simulations, while demand
dynamics contribute to asymmetries in price distributions as shown by Arango (2006c) through
experiments. Thus, investigations of these aspects of demand may complement this experiment.
Another example is investment restrictions. In our experiment, subjects were allowed to invest even
when they had accumulated negative earnings for several periods. That is, we did not consider
bankruptcy as part of the experimental design. Brander & Lewis (1988) showed theoretically that
the possibility of incurring bankruptcy costs influence the firm’s optimal output strategy in
oligopolies. For example, in the most standard formulation of bankruptcy costs in the literature, i.e.,
when bankruptcy costs are taken to be fixed, a firm has an incentive to be most aggressive when it
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is most vulnerable, i.e., at very high debt levels because its debt causes a reduction in the rival’s
equilibrium (Brander & Lewis, 1988). Conversely, firms would choose to hold no debt when
bankruptcy costs are proportional to the financial shortfall, as both the rival’s output and the own
probability of bankruptcy are minimized with debt equal to zero (Brander & Lewis, 1988). Hence,
further experiments may introduce bankruptcy costs and other financial aspects that make more
realistic the investment activity.
We did not differentiate between power generating technologies either. This would imply some
changes in the experimental design because not all the power generating technologies have the same
construction time. In this experiment we assumed a four year investment delay, which perhaps is
close to the construction time of a medium-sized hydro power plant. Large-sized hydro power
plants may take up even more than 10 years of construction. Other technologies have construction
times lower than four years, e.g., fossil fuel power plants. Arango (2006a) already showed that the
lower the delays, the more stable the market behavior. Moreover, there is experimental evidence
showing that the greater the delays, the greater the instabilities that could arise (Kampmann, 1992;
Diehl & Sterman, 1995). Hence, there is not motivation to differentiate between power generating
technologies under the argument of the effects of investment delays.
The economics of different power generating technologies may influence market behavior,
however. For example, the economics of a gas turbine combined-cycle plant is heavily influenced
by the volatile cost of natural gas. In fact, higher escalation in gas prices may lead to higher
escalation in electricity prices in the short-term, but at the same time may lead to a more stable
behavior in the long-term as shown by Ford (1999) through simulations. In another example, the
economics of a hydro power plant is influenced by hydrological conditions. In fact, during the
macroclimate phenomenon “El Niño”, the pool prices in the Colombian electricity market increase
considerably (Arango, 2007). Hence, there is motivation to differentiate between power generating
technologies under the argument of their economics. Therefore, future works may consider the
economics of different power generating technologies and assess their effects over decision-making
outcomes. Finally, this experiment can easily be expanded in order to embrace aspects of a
particular electricity market to test different stabilizing policies, regulations, and deregulations,
among others.
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Appendix A. Software interfaces (in Spanish).
T1 software interface.
T2 software interface.
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Appendix B. Cournot Nash equilibrium derivation.
According to the Cournot Nash model, an oligopolistic market is in equilibrium if each company
produces the same expected production of the other companies in the market, under conditions of
profit maximization. The profit function for each company is:
  iqCPiπ  (15)
Where P is the market price, C corresponds to the marginal costs, which include both capital and
operational costs, and qi is the production for subject i.
The electricity price is given to equilibrate supply and demand. Supply is the sum of the production
of the five subjects. Demand is price sensitive and is given by the following expression:
SBAP  (16)
With A = 6 and B = 0.1. S corresponds to the sum of the production of the five subjects, i.e., total
electricity supply.
In summary, with high production rates, the price will be low. Respectively, with low production
rates, the price will be high. There is no economic growth, which means that demand only changes
because of changes in the price.
According to the Cournot Nash model:
i5qS  (17)
Replacing (17) in (16):
iqB5AP  (18)
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Each subject assumes that the rest of the subjects will produce the same quantities than him. The
quantity is the result of a profit maximization exercise assuming that others’ production is constant,
and in equilibrium the quantity is not time dependent. The following expression gives us the first-
order condition for the production qi (Martin, 2002):
 
0
idq
iqdc
dS
dP
iqPiq
iπ 

(19)
Taking the cost function from T1 the first-order condition becomes:
0CiqBP
iq
iπ 

(20)
Replacing (18) in (20):
0CiqBiqB5A
iq
iπ 

(21)
We know A = 6, B = 0.1 and C = 1. Replacing these values in (21) we obtain that the equilibrium
production for the Cournot Nash model is:
qi = 8.33 Units
Replacing this value in (18) we obtain the equilibrium price for the Cournot Nash model:
P = 1.83 E$/Unit
To link T2 with T1 the Cournot Nash equilibrium must be the same. Given that in T2 we have
variable capacity utilization, the production for each subject is given by:
iCUiICiq  (22)
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Where ICi and CUi are the installed capacity and the capacity utilization of subject i respectively.
Isolating the installed capacity and replacing in the cost function showed in equation (7) in section
5.1.2, we get the following total cost function for each subject:
iCU
iqαiqβic  (23)
Taking this cost function, the first-order condition becomes:
0
iCU
α
βiqBP
iq
iπ 





(24)
Replacing (18) in (24):
0
iCU
α
βiqBiqB5A
iq
iπ 





(25)
In T1 we work under a full utilization assumption, i.e., CUi = 1 (100%). With this value, the
expression in parentheses becomes β + α. Isolating this expression, replacing A and B by the known
values and replacing qi by the Cournot Nash equilibrium in order to link T2 with T1 and therefore
with Arango (2006a and 2006b), we obtain the following expression:
1αβ  (26)
Thus, parameters β and α must be chosen in such a way that they hold the expression shown in (26).
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Appendix C. Experimental instructions (in Spanish).
Additional wording for T2 is inside square brackets ([]) and underlined, while changes are inside
curly brackets ({}) and are introduced with an underlined statement.
INSTRUCCIONES
ADVERTENCIA: NO TOQUE EL COMPUTADOR HASTA QUE SE LE AVISE
INTRODUCCIÓN
Bienvenidos. Éste es un experimento de toma de decisiones y el caso es un mercado eléctrico
desregulado, apoyado por la Vicerrectoría Nacional de Investigación de la Universidad Nacional de
Colombia. Las instrucciones son simples y si las sigue cuidadosamente y toma buenas decisiones
usted podría ganar una suma de dinero considerable, el cual será entregado en efectivo al final del
experimento. Usted va a jugar el rol de un productor de electricidad que vende en un mercado. Cada
período usted tomará decisiones de inversión que afectarán su [capacidad de] producción futura [,
además de decisiones de utilización de capacidad que afectarán su producción]. Su objetivo es
maximizar las ganancias a lo largo de todos los períodos del experimento. Entre mayores sean sus
ganancias acumuladas, mayor será su pago.
ESTRUCTURA DEL MERCADO
Usted es uno entre cinco productores de electricidad. Usted no sabe quiénes son los otros jugadores
en el mercado y cómo se desempeñan individualmente. Sus ganancias son estimadas como:
Ganancias = Producción·(Precio – Costos)
{For T2 the equation is: Ganancias = Ingresos – Costo de Producción – Costo de Capital}
 C
t
P
t
q
t
π 
{For T2 the equation is:
t
CIα
t
qβ
t
q
t
P
t
π  }
Donde qt corresponde a su producción en el tiempo t, Pt al precio de la electricidad en el tiempo t y
C a los costos tanto de operación como de capital, que son constantes y equivalen a 1 E$/Unidad
{For T2 the costs are: CIt a su capacidad instalada en el tiempo t, β a los costos de producción y α a
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los costos de capital (piense en los costos de capital como costos de arrendamiento). Los costos de
producción equivalen a 0.4 E$/Unidad y los costos de capital a 0.6 E$/Unidad}. Su [capacidad de]
producción no puede ser negativa y siempre debe estar por debajo de 20 unidades, que es un
límite superior que garantiza un mínimo de competencia. El precio de la electricidad es fijado para
equilibrar el suministro total y la demanda. El suministro total es la suma de la producción de los
cinco jugadores, y la demanda es sensitiva al precio así:
QP  1.06 , donde Q es el suministro total (véase la figura Curva de demanda abajo).
Para resumir, entre mayor sea la producción total de electricidad, menor es el precio.
Respectivamente, entre menor sea la producción total de electricidad, mayor es el precio. No hay
crecimiento económico, lo que significa que la demanda sólo cambia debido a cambios del precio.
Curva de demanda.
PRODUCCIÓN
Su producción será siempre igual a su capacidad de producción, lo que significa que usted no puede
reducir su utilización de capacidad {For T2 the sentence is: Su producción es función de la
capacidad instalada y la utilización de capacidad}. Cada año usted toma decisiones de inversión en
capacidad nueva (usted puede decidir 0 Unidades) [, así como decisiones de utilización de
capacidad (usted puede decidir utilizar entre el 70% (0.7) y el 100% (1) de su capacidad)].
Características importantes de los generadores de electricidad son:
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Retraso en la construcción = 4 años.
Tiempo de vida de la capacidad instalada = 16 años.
[Retraso en la utilización = 1 año]
Esto significa que si usted decide invertir en una capacidad adicional de 0.8 Unidades en el año 6,
esta capacidad estará bajo construcción por 4 años y añadirá 0.8 Unidades a su capacidad en el año
10. Esta capacidad adicional durará hasta el año 26 inclusive [Además, si usted decide utilizar el
80% (0.8) de su capacidad en la producción en el año 6, esta decisión se hará efectiva en el año 7.
Debe tener en cuenta que esta decisión de utilización de capacidad no se hará efectiva con la
capacidad instalada del año 6 sino con la capacidad instalada del año 7].
CONDICIÓN INICIAL
Cuando el experimento comience los administradores anteriores de la firma han invertido una
cantidad constante de 11 Unidades/vida útil = 0.69 Unidades/año por un largo tiempo.
Consecuentemente, usted comienza con una [capacidad de] producción de 11 Unidades y una tasa
de depreciación de 0.69 Unidades/año [Adicionalmente, durante el mismo período de tiempo han
tomado decisiones de utilización de capacidad de 100% (1). De esta manera, usted comienza con
una producción de 11 Unidades]. Así, todas las firmas son idénticas, tienen los mismos costos y la
misma capacidad inicial. El mercado comienza con una producción total inicial de 11 Unidades·5
firmas = 55 Unidades; para un producción total de 55 Unidades, el precio es 0.5 E$/Unidad. Esto
significa que inicialmente todos están operando con precios más bajos que sus costos.
PAGO
Usted recibirá un pago de acuerdo a su desempeño. Su desempeño es medido por sus ganancias
acumuladas. Entre mayores sean las ganancias acumuladas, mayor será el pago. El pago estará
entre Col$ 10.000 y Col$ 50.000.
CORRIENDO EL EXPERIMENTO
Sea cuidadoso, no presione “Accept Decisions” A MENOS QUE ESTÉ SEGURO. Luego de
presionar “Accept Decisions” su decisión no puede ser cambiada.
1. Mire la información disponible de la firma y el mercado y tome decisiones de inversión [y
de utilización de capacidad].
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2. Escriba sus decisiones en la hoja que le fue entregada (sus decisiones deben estar anotadas
en la hoja pues ésta es su recibo para el pago) y presione “Accept Decisions”.
3. Espere hasta que todos los participantes en el mercado hayan tomado sus decisiones.
La ventana con el botón “Accept Decisions” aparece de nuevo, el juego ha avanzado al siguiente
año. La información es actualizada y es tiempo de tomar decisiones nuevamente. La simulación
correrá por un número indefinido de años. Cuando el experimentador pare el juego usted debe
escribir sus ganancias acumuladas en la hoja y preguntar por su pago. Los pagos se harán en
privado.
NOTA
De acuerdo al propósito del experimento se requiere no compartir ningún tipo de información
(verbal, escrita, gestos, etc.). Por favor, respete estas reglas pues éstas son importantes para el valor
científico del experimento. Romper las reglas implica que el grupo involucrado es anulado y sus
participantes no reciben pago.
Gracias por unirse a este experimento y haga su mejor esfuerzo!!!
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Appendix D. Derivation of the linear form of the proposed aggregated heuristics.
Investment behavior
We derivate the linear decision rule with the following equations:
  







 0,tC*tCcαtSLID
*
tC
slαLT
tCMaxtx
tPtC 1060 
t
YPa,
t
P
eP
aeq
aMax*
t
C  







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a
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To shorten the presentation, we neglect the index t and take the linear parts. The equations become:





  SL
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*C
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*C
c
α
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C
x
PC 1060 
YPa*C 
Replacing, grouping and simplifying:
SL
slαID
*C
slαCcα
*C
c
α
LT
C
x 
    SL
slαID
YPa
slαPcαYPacαLT
P
x  10601060
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YP
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a
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c
α
c
αYP
c
αa
c
α
LT
P
LT
x  10601060
We get the following expression:
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601010 , which is analogous
to the expression needed:
btPmtSLmtx  12
The parameter values are:
a = 38
qe = 41,7
Pe = 1,83
LT = 16
ID = 4
αc = 0,26 (set 1) and 0,5 (set 2)
αsl = 0,1 (set 1) and 0,5 (set 2)
Finally, the coefficient values are presented in the following table:
Coefficient values of the linear form of the investment heuristic.
Coefficient Set 1 Set 2
m2 -0,10 -0,50
m1 2,55 5,63
b -1,02 -2,5
Capacity utilization adjustment behavior
We derivate the linear decision rule with the following equation and the tabular function
represented in Figure 5:
 tCU*tCUcuαadjusttCU 
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As the desired capacity utilization function is a tabular function, we fit a function to the curve of the
desired capacity utilization. The fitting was done using the Artificial Neural Network method. The
fitted function is:
tP,,e
,
,
*
tCU 633822
1
310670 

The following figure shows the results of the fitting process. It can be observed that the obtained
function is a good approximation for the actual desired capacity utilization function.
Curve fitting for the desired capacity utilization function.
To shorten the presentation, we neglect the index t. Replacing CU* in CUadjust we obtain the
following expression:



  CUP,,e
,
,cuα
adjustCU 6338221
310670
Replacing, grouping and simplifying:
CUcuαP,,e
cuαcuα
adjustCU 

6338221
131,067,0
We get the following expression:
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expression is analogous to the expression needed:
bZmtCUm
adjust
t
CU  12
We have one parameter value: αcu = 0,5.
Finally, the coefficient values are presented in the following table:
Coefficient values of the linear form of the capacity utilization adjustment heuristic.
Coefficient Value
m2 -0,5
m1 0,16
b 0,34
